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Constitutional Promise vs. Ground Reality: Tribal Communities in Odisha

Compiled: 2026-04-02 Scope: Comprehensive research covering constitutional protections, legislative frameworks, institutional mechanisms, and implementation gaps for tribal communities in Odisha Word count: ~12,000 words (11,968) Sources: 100+ cited

1. Fifth Schedule Areas in Odisha

1.1 What the Fifth Schedule Says

Article 244(1) of the Indian Constitution provides for the administration of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the provisions of the Fifth Schedule. The Fifth Schedule applies to ten states: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan, and Telangana.

The Fifth Schedule establishes a distinct governance framework for areas with significant tribal populations. Its core provisions include:

Definition of Scheduled Areas: Areas that the President may by order declare to be Scheduled Areas. Criteria for declaration include preponderance of tribal population, compactness and reasonable size, underdeveloped nature, and marked disparity in economic standard compared to neighbouring areas.
Executive power of the Union: The executive power of the Union extends to giving directions to states regarding the administration of Scheduled Areas (Paragraph 3).
Governor’s annual report: The Governor of each state with Scheduled Areas must annually report to the President on their administration (Paragraph 3).
Tribes Advisory Council: Each state with Scheduled Areas must establish a Tribes Advisory Council (Paragraph 4).
Governor’s regulatory powers: The Governor may direct that any Act of Parliament or state legislature shall not apply to a Scheduled Area, or shall apply with modifications. The Governor may also make regulations for peace and good governance, including prohibiting or restricting transfer of land by or among tribal members, regulating money-lending, and regulating allotment of land (Paragraph 5).

Source: Fifth Schedule, Article 244(1)

1.2 Map and Extent of Scheduled Areas in Odisha

Odisha’s Scheduled Areas cover approximately 44.71% of the state’s total land area, making it one of the most extensively scheduled states in India. Nationally, Scheduled Areas cover 11.3% of India’s total land area.

After reorganisation of districts, 7 districts are fully designated and 6 districts are partially designated as Scheduled Areas:

Fully Scheduled Districts (7):

District	Notes
Mayurbhanj	Largest ST population in Odisha (14,79,576; 58.72% of district population)
Sundargarh	Major mining district
Koraput	Part of undivided Koraput; high tribal concentration
Malkangiri	Carved from Koraput; home to Bonda, Didayi PVTGs
Nabarangpur	Carved from Koraput
Rayagada	Carved from Koraput; Dongria Kondh territory

Note: Some sources list 6 fully scheduled districts (excluding one), while others list 7. The discrepancy arises from the reorganisation of undivided Koraput into four separate districts. The Presidential Order of 1977 originally designated the undivided Koraput as fully scheduled; subsequent district reorganisation created four fully scheduled districts from one.

Partially Scheduled Districts (6):

District	Scheduled Areas
Sambalpur	Kuchinda tahasil
Keonjhar	Keonjhar, Telkoi, Champua, Barbil tahasils
Kandhamal	Kandhamal, Balliguda, and G. Udayagiri tahasils
Ganjam	R. Udaygiri tahasil, Gumma and Rayagada block of Parlakhemundi tahasil, and Suruda tahasil (excluding Gazalbadi and Gochha Gram Panchayats)
Kalahandi	Thuamul Rampur and Lanjigarh blocks
Balasore	Nilagiri block

Sources: Scheduled Areas Order 1977; Utkal Today on Scheduled Areas; Grokipedia

1.3 History of Designation

The history of Scheduled Area designation in Odisha follows this trajectory:

Pre-independence: Under the Government of India Act, 1935, certain areas were classified as “excluded” and “partially excluded” areas.
1950: The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, designated initial Scheduled Tribes in Odisha. The original list included 42 tribes.
1956: The Scheduled Tribes Modification Order added 21 new tribes.
1977: The Scheduled Areas (States of Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa) Order, 1977, issued on December 31, 1977, provided the revised and comprehensive designation of Scheduled Areas that forms the current basis. This order covered 44.71% of Odisha’s land area.
Post-2000: As Odisha reorganised its districts (undivided Koraput split into Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, and Rayagada), the Scheduled Area designations carried over to the new districts.
2024: The Constitution (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Orders (Amendment) Act, 2024, made further modifications to the list of Scheduled Tribes.

Currently, Odisha recognises 64 distinct ST communities including 13 PVTGs — the highest number of tribal communities and PVTGs of any Indian state. STs comprise 22.85% and SCs 17.13% of the state’s population (Census 2011), together making up nearly 40%. (Odisha Economic Survey 2025-26, Ch. 9 §9.7.2)

Sources: SCSTRTI on Tribes; Ministry of Tribal Affairs

1.4 Governor’s Special Powers in Scheduled Areas

Under the Fifth Schedule, the Governor of Odisha holds extraordinary powers:

Legislative modification: The Governor may direct that any Act of Parliament or state legislature shall not apply to a Scheduled Area, or shall apply with exceptions and modifications (Paragraph 5(1)).
Regulation-making power: The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good governance of any Scheduled Area, including:
- Prohibiting or restricting transfer of land by or among members of Scheduled Tribes
- Regulating allotment of land to members of Scheduled Tribes
- Regulating money-lending to members of Scheduled Tribes (Paragraph 5(2))
Annual reporting: The Governor must annually report to the President regarding the administration of Scheduled Areas.

Ground reality: The Governor’s regulatory powers have been used sparingly and primarily in a protective sense (e.g., the 1956 Regulation on land transfer). However, there is no clarity on whether the Governor can make referrals on their own discretion or only on advice of the Council of Ministers. In practice, the Governor’s annual reports to the President have been routine administrative exercises rather than instruments of tribal advocacy. The Governor has rarely exercised the power to block or modify state legislation that affects tribal interests in Scheduled Areas.

Source: Fifth Schedule text; Vajiramandravi

1.5 Tribes Advisory Council (TAC) — Composition, Mandate, and Actual Functioning

Composition: The Tribes Advisory Council of Odisha consists of 20 members including the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and 15 members who are persons representing the Scheduled Tribes in the State Legislature. The Governor determines the structure, number of members, appointment process, chairperson, and other officials.

Legal basis: The Governor of Odisha enacted the Orissa Tribes Advisory Council Rules, 1950, in exercise of the power conferred by Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Schedule.

Mandate: The TAC advises on matters pertaining to the welfare and advancement of Scheduled Tribes as referred to it by the Governor. Its scope includes reviewing tribal welfare schemes, land alienation issues, and implementation of protective legislation.

Meetings: The Governor determines the frequency of meetings, which are held twice a year.

Actual functioning: The TAC has functioned largely as an advisory body with limited real influence. Key problems include:

Meetings are infrequent (typically twice a year) and agenda-driven by the state government rather than tribal representatives
The TAC’s advice is non-binding — the Governor and state government are not obliged to follow its recommendations
There is limited follow-up mechanism to ensure TAC recommendations are implemented
The TAC has not been an effective check on land alienation, mining in tribal areas, or displacement
An empirical study by Mohanty and Acharya found that the TAC’s role remains largely ceremonial

Confidence level: ~75%. The TAC’s ineffectiveness is well-documented in academic literature, though comprehensive recent data on its functioning is limited.

Sources: Odisha ST&SC Department; SSRN Study on TAC; Adda247

2. PESA (Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996

2.1 What PESA Promised

The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), enacted on December 24, 1996, was designed to extend the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution (Panchayats) to Scheduled Areas in a manner that empowered tribal communities through gram sabhas. PESA promised:

Power Area	What PESA Guaranteed
Land alienation	Gram Sabha to safeguard and preserve traditions, customs, cultural identity, community resources, and customary mode of dispute resolution; prevent alienation of land in Scheduled Areas and restore unlawfully alienated land
Mining leases	Mandatory consultation with gram sabha or panchayat before granting prospecting licence or mining lease for minor minerals
Forest produce	Ownership of minor forest produce vested in gram sabha
Minor water bodies	Plans and management of minor water bodies entrusted to panchayats
Money lending	Gram sabha to regulate or restrict money lending to Scheduled Tribes
Intoxicants	Gram sabha to control manufacture, possession, sale, and consumption of intoxicants
Land acquisition	Mandatory consultation before land acquisition; recommendation of gram sabha required for resettlement or rehabilitation of displaced persons
Development plans	Every gram sabha to approve plans, programmes, and projects for social and economic development

PESA was revolutionary in intent: it sought to make gram sabhas — the general assembly of all adult residents of a village — the primary institution of governance in tribal areas, reversing the top-down bureaucratic model.

Source: PESA Act 1996 full text

2.2 Odisha’s PESA Compliance

Odisha’s compliance with PESA has been systematically incomplete over nearly three decades:

What was done:

The Government of Odisha incorporated some provisions of PESA into its existing Panchayati Raj Act, the Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1964, through amendments.
Certain provisions on the role of gram sabhas in social sector schemes were nominally incorporated.

What remains unimplemented:

PESA rules have never been finalised. As of 2026, Odisha is one of only two states (along with Jharkhand, which notified rules in January 2026) that have not finalised PESA rules. The Government of Odisha published a draft notification for Odisha Grama Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Rules, 2023, in the Odisha Gazette on November 10, 2023 — 27 years after PESA was enacted. The rules remain in draft form.
Gram sabha powers over land acquisition have not been substantively operationalised. The draft PESA rules require the land acquisition officer to “consult” the gram panchayat (not gram sabha) on proposed acquisitions. Critically, the draft rules are silent on the power of gram sabhas to refuse or accept land acquisition.
Gram sabha powers over mining are diluted in the draft rules. Gram sabhas will not have any power regarding excavation and use of minor minerals from forestlands.
Ownership of minor forest produce has not been effectively transferred to gram sabhas.
Control over money lending to tribals remains unimplemented through PESA mechanisms.

Timeline of non-compliance:

Year	Event
1996	PESA Act enacted by Parliament
1997-2009	Odisha makes partial amendments to Grama Panchayats Act; no standalone PESA rules
2010	Draft PESA rules prepared but never finalised
2013	Supreme Court in Niyamgiri case directs Odisha government to consult gram sabhas for mining
2021	25 years of PESA; Odisha still without rules
2023	Draft rules published in Odisha Gazette (Nov 10, 2023) for public comments
2024	New BJP state government; minister assures PESA rules will be presented to Assembly
2026	Rules still not finalised

Sources: PESA Wikipedia; PIB on PESA implementation; RCDC Report on PESA Odisha; Down to Earth on PESA

2.3 The CAG Findings on PESA Non-Implementation

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) conducted a Performance Audit of Land Management in Scheduled Areas of Odisha (Report No. 4 of the year 2024), which documented systematic violations of tribal land protections:

Key findings:

In 126 out of 294 land acquisition cases (43%), preliminary notifications for land acquisition were issued without conducting gram sabha meetings or obtaining the requisite consent, violating both PESA requirements and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR).
In 44 out of 254 land acquisition cases (17%), Social Impact Assessment (SIA) studies had not been carried out — a mandatory requirement under RFCTLARR.
Projects worth Rs 102.71 crore in Sundargarh district were executed without Board of Trustees (BoT) approval for DMF fund utilisation.
Proposals approved by gram sabhas were ignored, while other projects were taken up without gram sabha consent.
The CAG also flagged diversion of Rs 136.77 crore of District Mineral Foundation (DMF) funds for construction of an international hockey stadium in Rourkela — funds meant for welfare of mining-affected communities, many of whom are tribal.

Note on the “136 violations” figure: Some sources reference “136 violations without gram sabha consent” from the CAG findings. The CAG report documents 126 cases of land acquisition without proper gram sabha consent (43% of 294 cases examined). The “136” figure may refer to the Rs 136.77 crore DMF fund diversion in Sundargarh or a broader tally across different audit categories. The distinction matters but the core finding is the same: gram sabha consent — the foundation of PESA — is routinely bypassed.

Sources: CAG Report Chapter 3; CAG Full Report; Business Standard on DMF

2.4 Why PESA Has Been Systematically Undermined

The failure to implement PESA is not accidental. It reflects a convergence of institutional, political, and economic incentives:

Economic conflict of interest: Odisha’s mineral-rich Scheduled Areas generate enormous revenue for the state. Effective gram sabha control over mining leases and land acquisition would directly threaten the extraction model that has sustained state finances. Odisha produces approximately 50% of India’s iron ore, much of it from Scheduled Areas. Gram sabha veto power over mining would be economically catastrophic for the existing model.
Bureaucratic resistance: PESA fundamentally challenges the bureaucratic power structure. It transfers decision-making authority from district collectors and block development officers to gram sabhas — a radical decentralisation that India’s administrative culture has resisted.
Political calculation: No ruling party in Odisha — neither the BJD (1997-2024) nor the BJP (2024-present) — has found it politically expedient to genuinely empower gram sabhas. The announcement of draft rules serves as a gesture; non-finalisation serves the status quo.
Legal complexity: Multiple state laws on land, forests, mining, excise, and revenue conflict with or override PESA provisions. Harmonising these requires substantial legislative effort that no government has prioritised.
Information asymmetry: Tribal communities often lack awareness of their PESA rights. A study in Jharkhand found that 65% of people whose land was acquired said they were not even asked about it.

2.5 Comparison with Other States

State	PESA Rules Notified	Key Feature
Maharashtra	2014	Earliest among major states; Governor issued notifications to align state laws with PESA; MFP ownership transferred to gram sabhas
Madhya Pradesh	2022	Rules notified; implementation remains patchy
Chhattisgarh	2022	Rules notified; December 24 observed as Gaon Ganrajya Divas
Rajasthan	2011	Among earlier adopters
Gujarat	2017	Rules notified
Jharkhand	January 2026	Most recent; activated by the PESA Mahotsav campaign
Odisha	Not notified (draft 2023)	27+ years without finalised rules
Andhra Pradesh/Telangana	Partial	Partial compliance through state legislation amendments

No state has achieved full PESA compliance in practice. Even states with notified rules face significant ground-level implementation gaps. A study conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA) in six districts of three states — Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha — found that:

In Jharkhand’s Khunti district, 65% of people whose land was acquired said they were not even asked about it
In Gumla district (Jharkhand), 26% had similar complaints
Even in states with formal PESA rules, laws related to land, forests, mining, excise, and revenue frequently conflict with or override gram sabha authority

Maharashtra’s experience with gram sabha empowerment in Gadchiroli district demonstrates what is possible when institutional will exists. The state proactively issued Governor’s notifications to align subject laws with PESA, transferred MFP ownership to gram sabhas, and created an enabling environment for community forest governance. This did not happen automatically — it required sustained civil society advocacy, progressive district administrations, and political will at the state level.

2.6 The PESA Districts in Odisha

Odisha has 13 PESA-applicable districts — 6 fully and 7 partially covered:

Fully covered: Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Mayurbhanj, Sundargarh, Koraput

Partially covered: Sambalpur (Kuchinda), Keonjhar (Keonjhar/Telkoi/Champua/Barbil tahasils), Kandhamal (Kandhamal/Balliguda/G.Udayagiri), Ganjam (R.Udaygiri/Suruda/parts of Parlakhemundi), Kalahandi (Thuamul Rampur/Lanjigarh blocks), Balasore (Nilagiri block), and Gajapati (partially).

These 13 districts encompass 118 blocks with 50% or more ST population. Within these blocks, gram sabhas should — under PESA — have authority over land acquisition, mining leases, forest produce, and local governance. In practice, without finalised rules, these powers remain on paper.

The contradiction in the Odisha draft rules (2023): The draft rules reveal the state’s resistance to genuine devolution. While the Central PESA Act mandates gram sabha consent for land acquisition, the Odisha draft substitutes “consultation” with the gram panchayat (an elected body, not the gram sabha which is the general assembly). The draft is silent on gram sabha power to refuse land acquisition. For mining, gram sabhas are explicitly excluded from authority over minor minerals on forestland. This is not compliance — it is the dilution of PESA through the rules themselves.

Sources: Mongabay on PESA; Down to Earth on PESA; ResearchGate study; CFDRA on PESA Odisha

3. Forest Rights Act 2006 (FRA)

3.1 What FRA Promised

The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, enacted to correct “historical injustice” to forest-dwelling communities, promised three categories of rights:

Individual Forest Rights (IFR): Right to hold and live in forest land under individual or common occupation for habitation or self-cultivation for livelihood, up to a maximum of 4 hectares. Includes right of ownership, access, and disposal of minor forest produce.
Community Forest Rights (CFR): Rights of community over forest land including:
- Right to use or collect minor forest produce
- Right of ownership, access, and disposal of minor forest produce (nistar rights)
- Rights over community forest resources (previously state-controlled forests managed and protected by gram sabhas for sustainable use)
- Right to protect, regenerate, conserve, and manage community forest resources
Habitat Rights for PVTGs: Rights of Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups to their traditional habitats — including customary activities, habitation, and other sociocultural practices.

3.2 Odisha’s FRA Implementation Data

Overall claim status (as of October 2025, NCST review meeting):

Category	Claims Received	Claims Granted	Claims Rejected	Claims Pending
Individual Forest Rights (IFR)	7,32,000	4,64,000	~1,44,000	~1,22,000
Community Forest Rights (CFR)	Limited data	Limited	Many pending	Significant

Earlier detailed data (Vasundhara/Down to Earth, various years):

Metric	Figure
Total IFR claims submitted (ST)	6,21,195
Total IFR claims recognised (ST)	4,37,718
IFR acceptance rate	~72%
IFR rejection rate	~27%
OTFD (Other Traditional Forest Dweller) claims submitted	31,690
OTFD claims recognised	73
OTFD acceptance rate	0.23%
Community Forest Resource rights area recognised	~3.74 lakh acres
Estimated potential CFR area	27,818 sq km
Estimated potential IFR area	7,921 sq km
Total estimated potential FRA area	35,739 sq km
Total villages where rights should be recognised	32,562

The OTFD figure is striking: Of 31,690 claims by Other Traditional Forest Dwellers, only 73 were recognised — a 99.77% rejection rate. This effectively excludes non-tribal forest-dwelling communities from FRA benefits in Odisha.

3.3 District-level Data

Village coverage (CAG audit of 5 sampled districts):

District	Total Villages	FRC Constituted	Fully Covered	Coverage %
Deogarh	774	679	0	0%
Sambalpur	1,232	1,208	743	60.71%
Koraput	1,890	1,890	1,188	62.86%
Malkangiri	933	933	305	32.69%
Sundargarh	Data available	Data available	Data available	~38%
Total (4 districts)	4,829	4,710	2,236	46.30%

Deogarh’s 0% full coverage is particularly notable — despite having Forest Rights Committees constituted in 679 of 774 villages, not a single village has been fully covered under FRA.

Claim rejections at SDLC level (5 sampled districts):

District	Rejected Claims	Reasons Recorded	Individual Details	Case Records
Malkangiri	1,584	1,584	0	0
Koraput	452	452	452	0
Deogarh	5,455	5,455	5,455	5,455
Sambalpur	6,223	5,907	5,907	0
Sundargarh	6,909	0	0	0
Total	20,623	13,398	11,814	5,455

Sundargarh rejected 6,909 claims without recording any reasons at all. In Malkangiri, individual details were not recorded for any of the 1,584 rejections. This is not administrative oversight; it is systemic disregard for due process.

Sources: Down to Earth on FRA rejection; Vasundhara FRA Factsheet 2023; Scroll on FRA rejections; Mongabay on FRA

3.4 Why Rejection Rates Are So High

The CAG audit and investigative reports reveal multiple systemic reasons:

Lack of evidence cited as reason — but evidence was never solicited. About 42% of claims are rejected due to “lack of evidence,” but FRC members report that forest and revenue maps were never provided to them (87.5% reported non-receipt of maps in the CAG sample).
Awareness gaps among FRC members. Among 72 FRC members interviewed across 23 committees:
- 80.56% were unaware of Community Forest Resources
- 79.17% were unfamiliar with community rights concepts
- 87.50% reported non-receipt of forest/revenue maps from authorities
- 86.11% lacked electoral rolls from authorities
Perfunctory gram sabha process. In Odisha’s Kandhamal district, what was counted as an “approved” claim was, in many cases, granted for only a fraction of the land for which the claim was filed. A claim for 2 acres might be approved for 0.5 acres — technically an “approval” but practically a rejection.
Re-rejection upon review. When Odisha reviewed 148,870 rejected IFR claims at the DLC level, it re-rejected 140,504 — a re-rejection rate of 94%. This suggests the review process is not a genuine appeal mechanism but a rubber-stamp of prior rejections.
Closure of FRA Cells. In recent developments, Odisha shut down 50 Sub-Divisional FRA Cells even as claims remained pending, effectively dismantling the institutional infrastructure for processing claims.
Forest department resistance. The forest bureaucracy views FRA as a threat to its territorial control. Rights recognition reduces the area under Forest Department jurisdiction.

Source: Down to Earth on re-rejection; UnderStand UPSC on FRA cell closures

3.5 Role of Gram Sabhas in FRA Process vs. Actual Practice

Under FRA, the gram sabha is the primary institution for initiating, verifying, and recommending forest rights claims. The process is meant to be bottom-up:

Gram sabha receives claims
Forest Rights Committee (elected by gram sabha) verifies claims
Gram sabha passes resolution approving or rejecting claims
Claims forwarded to Sub-Divisional Level Committee (SDLC), then District Level Committee (DLC)

In practice: The process is often inverted. Administrative officers decide which claims to approve or reject; gram sabhas are either bypassed or their decisions are overridden by SDLCs and DLCs. The FRC verification process is often perfunctory, with forest officials rather than elected FRC members making the effective determination.

3.6 Comparison with Maharashtra and Kerala

Metric	Odisha	Maharashtra	Kerala
CFR titles as % of potential	~5%	~15%	~14%
Notable achievement	Habitat rights for 9 PVTGs (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.14)	Gadchiroli: gram sabhas as “body corporate”	GPS mapping for community rights
Best practice district	Limited	Gadchiroli (Mendha-Lekha model)	Multiple
Community self-governance	Weak	Strong in Gadchiroli	Moderate

Maharashtra’s Gadchiroli model: Mendha-Lekha was the first village in India to receive community forest rights over 1,809 hectares. The gram sabha obtained a Permanent Account Number from the Income Tax Department, maintained a separate bank account with a Village Development Fund, and effectively functioned as a self-governing body. This demonstrates that FRA can work when institutional support exists.

Odisha’s relative position: Despite having the third-largest tribal population and extensive forest cover, Odisha lags significantly behind Maharashtra in CFR recognition. However, Odisha leads in PVTG habitat rights recognition (9 PVTGs granted habitat rights as of 2025 — Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.14).

Sources: Scroll on Maharashtra FRA; Down to Earth on CFR

3.7 Habitat Rights for PVTGs

Odisha has emerged as a national leader in PVTG habitat rights recognition under FRA:

PVTG	District	Status	Year
Paudi Bhuyan	Deogarh	First PVTG to receive habitat rights (32 villages under Barkote block)	March 2024
Juang	Keonjhar, Jajpur	DLC approved	2024
Saora	Gajapati	DLC approved	2024
Chuktia Bhunjia	Nuapada	DLC approved	2024
Hill Kharia	Mayurbhanj	DLC approved	2024
Mankidia	Mayurbhanj	6th PVTG to receive habitat rights	2024
Bonda	Malkangiri	Habitat rights granted	2025
Kutia Kandh	Kandhamal	Habitat rights granted	2025

Source for 2025 additions: Odisha Economic Survey 2025-26, Ch. 9 §9.7.14, which confirms habitat rights granted to nine PVTGs including the Bonda (Malkangiri) and Kutia Kandh (Kandhamal).

Habitat rights recognition grants communities the right to their traditional territory, socio-cultural practices, livelihoods, ecological and traditional knowledge, and the protection of their natural and cultural heritage. This is a significant positive development — the Bonda receiving habitat rights is particularly notable given their long-documented status as one of Odisha’s most marginalised PVTGs. The remaining PVTGs (Didayi, Dongria Kondh, Lanjia Saora, Lodha, Birhor) still await habitat rights recognition.

Potential habitat rights area: Odisha has the potential to recognise habitat rights in over 2.27 million hectares, of which 1.12 million hectares are under forest areas.

Sources: Down to Earth on Mankidia; IndiaSpend on habitat rights; Tathya on Odisha habitat rights

4. Samatha Judgment 1997

4.1 The Ruling

In Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1997 SC 3297), the Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment on July 11, 1997, addressing the issue of mining leases in Scheduled Areas. The case arose from the Borra Reserve Forest in Andhra Pradesh, where the state government had granted 20-year mining leases to non-tribal entities.

Key holdings:

Government, tribal, and forested lands in Scheduled Areas cannot be leased to non-tribal persons or private companies for mining purposes.
All mining leases transferred to non-tribal persons in Scheduled Areas of Andhra Pradesh were declared void and invalid.
The transfer of mining leases to “non-tribals” includes transfer to private companies — a company is a “person” under law.
The state government itself could not transfer tribal land to private mining companies, as this would circumvent the protective framework.
Tribals can extract minerals either individually or through cooperative companies with state financial help, without affecting the ecosystem or forest land.
The Court directed that 20% of the net profits from any mining operation should be set aside as a permanent fund for the development of Scheduled Areas.

4.2 How the Judgment Has Been Circumvented

Despite the clarity of the Samatha ruling, multiple methods have been employed to circumvent it:

State PSU as proxy: The most common circumvention is routing mining leases through state-owned Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs). The Supreme Court excluded state-owned agencies from the prohibition, creating a loophole. State PSUs like Odisha Mining Corporation (OMC) obtain the lease, then effectively operate in partnership with or as a conduit for private companies. In the Niyamgiri case, the Odisha Mining Corporation was the formal lease applicant, while Vedanta (a private company) was the effective operator of the alumina refinery.
“Public purpose” doctrine: Land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for “public purpose” (industrial development, national interest), bypassing the prohibition on direct transfer to non-tribals. In Kalinganagar, the Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation of Orissa (IDCO) acquired land from tribals at Rs 15,000-30,000 per acre, then transferred it to Tata Steel at Rs 3.5 lakh per acre.
Denial of applicability: Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik’s government took the position that the Samatha judgment was not binding on Odisha, since the case arose from Andhra Pradesh. This interpretation — that a Supreme Court judgment on constitutional provisions applying to all Scheduled Areas was state-specific — was legally questionable but politically convenient.
Lease renewals: Existing mining leases granted before the judgment have been renewed, avoiding the prohibition on new leases.
Legislative attempts: There have been periodic attempts to amend the Fifth Schedule itself to nullify the Samatha protections, though these have not succeeded.

4.3 Relevance to Odisha

The Samatha judgment is directly relevant to Odisha because:

Odisha is India’s largest producer of iron ore (~155 MT), chromite, and a major producer of bauxite, manganese, and coal
Much of this mining occurs in or adjacent to Scheduled Areas
The Niyamgiri case (Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2013) became a direct test of Samatha principles in Odisha, where the Supreme Court upheld the right of Dongria Kondh gram sabhas to reject bauxite mining

The pattern: The state government facilitates mining in Scheduled Areas using PSU proxies, acquires tribal land through “public purpose” claims, and treats gram sabha consent as a procedural formality rather than a substantive right. When forced to obtain consent (as in Niyamgiri), the consent process has sometimes resulted in rejection of projects, demonstrating that genuine gram sabha empowerment and the current extraction model are fundamentally incompatible.

4.4 The Economic Stakes

Understanding why the Samatha judgment is circumvented rather than enforced requires understanding the economic stakes:

Odisha produces approximately 50% of India’s iron ore, much of it from Scheduled Areas
The state is India’s leading producer of chromite, a major producer of manganese and bauxite
Mining revenue constitutes a significant portion of state revenue
The state has signed MoUs with multiple companies for steel, aluminium, and other processing plants worth hundreds of thousands of crores
The Odisha Mining Corporation (OMC), a state PSU, generated Rs 12,000+ crore in revenue in recent years

If the Samatha judgment were strictly enforced in Odisha:

All mining leases to private companies in Scheduled Areas would be void
Only state PSUs or tribal cooperatives could mine
The 20% net profit allocation to Scheduled Area development would redirect billions
The existing model of cheap land acquisition and corporate transfer would collapse

This is why the judgment has been treated as advisory rather than binding in Odisha. The economic cost of compliance is calculated to exceed the political cost of non-compliance. Tribal communities lack the organised political power to make non-compliance electorally expensive.

Confidence level: ~75%. The economic logic is well-supported by available data, but precise revenue figures from mining in Scheduled Areas specifically (as opposed to mining state-wide) are not publicly available in disaggregated form.

Sources: Samatha judgment analysis; Samatha full text; ESCR-Net; Down to Earth on Odisha mining; Commoncause on Samatha

5. PVTGs (Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups)

5.1 Odisha’s 13 PVTGs

Odisha has 13 of India’s 75 PVTGs — the highest concentration of any state. Total PVTG population in Odisha: approximately 773,092 (2011 Census data from SCSTRTI/PMC research).

#	PVTG	Population (2011)	Primary Location	Key Characteristics
1	Birhor	596	Sundargarh, Sambalpur	Smallest PVTG; nomadic rope-makers
2	Bonda (Bondo)	12,231	Malkangiri	Hill-dwelling; podu cultivation; 33% literacy
3	Chuktia Bhunjia	3,086	Nuapada	Habitat rights granted 2024
4	Didayi	8,890	Malkangiri	6.87% literacy; shifting cultivation
5	Dongria Kondh	9,659	Rayagada, Kalahandi	Niyamgiri protectors; 6.35% literacy
6	Juang	47,095	Keonjhar, Jajpur	30% literacy; habitat rights granted
7	Hill Kharia	2,800	Mayurbhanj	41.75% literacy; habitat rights granted
8	Kutia Kondh	39,761	Kandhamal, Kalahandi	4.98% literacy (lowest); 25% malaria prevalence
9	Lanjia Saora	40,913	Gajapati, Rayagada	30.68% literacy; distinctive wall paintings
10	Lodha	9,785	Mayurbhanj	27.20% literacy; formerly criminalised tribe
11	Mankidia	2,222	Mayurbhanj	Rope-makers; 6th PVTG with habitat rights
12	Paudi Bhuyan	61,303	Deogarh, Angul, Sundargarh, Keonjhar	33.18% literacy; first PVTG with habitat rights
13	Saora	534,751	Gajapati, Ganjam, Rayagada	Largest PVTG population; 36.13% literacy

Note: Population figures vary across sources. The PMC/SCSTRTI data cited here is from a 2024 peer-reviewed study drawing on Census 2011 and SCSTRTI surveys. Some sources cite lower figures (e.g., Bonda at 6,675 or 5,000) depending on whether they count the broader tribal group or only the PVTG-designated sub-group.

5.2 Development Indicators: PVTGs vs. General Population

Indicator	PVTGs (Odisha)	Odisha ST Average	Odisha Overall
Literacy rate	37.4% (weighted avg)	52.24%	72.87%
Lowest literacy	4.98% (Kutia Kondh)	—	—
Monthly per capita income	~Rs 2,100	Higher	Significantly higher
Malaria prevalence (2022)	8.1% (average); 25% (Kutia Kondh)	Lower	Much lower
Undernutrition (children)	43-79% depending on group	~38%	~34%
Anaemia (women)	70-92% in some groups	61.8% (Keonjhar)	State average lower
Access to modern healthcare	30-70% depending on accessibility	Higher	Much higher

Key health data by PVTG:

PVTG	Malaria (2022)	TB Prevalence	Sickle Cell Disease	Alcohol Use	Tobacco Use
Kutia Kondh	25%	2.6%	—	58.95%	71.63%
Dongria Kondh	13.8%	18%	2.0%	—	—
Paudi Bhuyan	11%	6%	3.8%	32.33%	57.33%
Bonda	7.8%	—	2.26%	66.7%	61.2%
Juang	—	—	3.6%	60-70%	57.14%
Hill Kharia	6.3%	—	—	—	—

Source: PMC/SCSTRTI health review

5.3 PVTG Development Schemes

Central schemes:

PM-JANMAN (Pradhan Mantri Janjatiya Adivasi Nyaya Maha Abhiyan): Launched 2023-24 with Rs 24,104 crore allocation for PVTGs across India. Covers housing, road connectivity, health, education, water, electricity, mobile connectivity.
Conservation-cum-Development Plans (CCDPs): Micro-projects for each PVTG group managed through dedicated development agencies.

State-level schemes (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.13-15):

OPELIP (Odisha PVTG Empowerment and Livelihoods Improvement Programme): IFAD-supported programme operating across 12 districts covering all 13 PVTGs. The Survey reports OPELIP has facilitated 6,741 SHGs, 735 Cluster-Level Federations (CLFs), and 89 Gram Panchayat-Level Federations (GPLFs), with ₹669 crore in expenditure during FY 2024-25. (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.13)
OTELP Plus (Odisha Tribal Empowerment and Livelihoods Programme): Operational across 18 backward blocks in 5 districts, covering 699 villages and enabling community-based development. Under OTELP Plus, 310 Minor Water Structures (MWS) have been constructed for irrigation security. (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.13 Table 9.6)
MMJJM (Mukhya Mantri Janajati Jana Jeevan Mission): State flagship scheme launched with ₹500 crore outlay over three years, targeting 1.5 lakh tribal households for livelihood enhancement, with ₹210 crore allocated for 2025-26. (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.13)
OPNIP (Odisha PVTG Nutrition Improvement Programme): Covers 13 PVTGs across 89 gram panchayats in 12 districts, operating 61 creches with ₹96.6 lakh expenditure serving 2,524 beneficiary families. (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.15)
PMAAGY (Pradhan Mantri Adi Adarsh Gram Yojana): 1,653 villages approved for integrated village-level development in tribal areas. (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.14)
Bonda Development Agency (BDA): Headquartered at Mudulipada, established 1976-77, implements programmes in education, healthcare, skill training.
Juang Development Agency: Operates in Keonjhar for Juang welfare.
Chief Minister’s Tribal Livelihood Mission: State initiative for economic empowerment.

Gap between scheme and reality: Despite multiple schemes, the data tells a different story:

In Bonda areas (Malkangiri), not a single resident of Barguda village is educated due to absence of a school or anganwadi centre
Malkangiri ranks among India’s 100 most underdeveloped districts
Infant mortality rate in Malkangiri: 50 (vs. India’s 32)
Every second child under 5 in Malkangiri was underweight in 2015-16

5.4 Case Study: The Bonda

The Bonda (also Bondo or Remo) of Malkangiri district represent the extreme case of constitutional promise vs. ground reality:

Constitutional protections in theory: As a PVTG in a fully Scheduled district, the Bonda are protected by the Fifth Schedule, PESA (if implemented), FRA, and receive dedicated development funding through the Bonda Development Agency (established 1976).

Reality after 50 years of “development”:

Literacy: 33% overall (39.79% male, 25.74% female) — compared to state average of 73%
Literacy after nearly 50 years of BDA: Despite the Bonda Development Agency operating since 1976-77, literacy remains at one-third of the state average
Malnutrition: 79.08% undernutrition rate among Upper Bonda, 41.83% among Lower Bonda
Healthcare: 7.8% malaria prevalence; 66.7% alcohol consumption; limited access to modern healthcare
Livelihood: Primarily podu (slash-and-burn) cultivation on forest slopes; lack of land ownership
Infrastructure: Villages like Barguda lack schools, anganwadi centres, and basic road connectivity; children must trek 2 km over steep hills for education
HBV prevalence: As high as 14.18% (2023 study)

The paradox: The Bonda have been “targets” of development schemes for 50 years. They live in a Scheduled Area. They are designated as a PVTG. They have a dedicated development agency. And yet their development indicators remain among the worst in India. The gap between institutional architecture and lived reality could not be starker.

5.5 Case Study: The Dongria Kondh and Niyamgiri

The Dongria Kondh of Niyamgiri represent a different face of the tribal protection story — one where constitutional mechanisms actually worked, but only because of extraordinary mobilisation:

Population: ~9,659 (some sources say ~8,000)
Literacy: 6.35% — the second lowest of any PVTG in Odisha
Location: Niyamgiri hills, Rayagada and Kalahandi districts
The threat: Vedanta Resources planned a 3 MTPA bauxite mine atop Niyam Dongar — a mountain the Dongria consider the seat of their deity, Niyam Raja. The 70 million tonnes of bauxite reserves atop the mountain also function as a natural sponge that feeds perennial streams across the hills.

What happened:

2003: Vedanta’s subsidiary signs MoU with Odisha government
2004-2012: Environmental clearances granted and challenged; construction of alumina refinery at Lanjigarh begins
2013: Supreme Court rules that Dongria Kondh gram sabhas must have a “decisive say” (Orissa Mining Corporation v. MoEF)
August 2013: All 12 gram sabhas vote unanimously against mining
January 2014: MoEFCC rejects the mining project

Why it matters: Niyamgiri is the exception that proves the rule. The constitutional framework — specifically FRA and PESA provisions on gram sabha consent — actually worked. But it required a Supreme Court intervention, international NGO campaigns (Survival International, Amnesty International), extensive media coverage, and years of legal battle. This is not a scalable model for protecting tribal rights. If every tribal community needs to fight to the Supreme Court to exercise rights that are already guaranteed by law, the law is not functioning.

Sources: Ritimo on Niyamgiri; Land Conflict Watch; Climate Diplomacy; Pragativadi on Bonda

6. Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP)

6.1 What TSP Was Supposed to Do

The Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP) strategy, introduced in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79), mandated that:

State governments earmark funds for tribal development in proportion to the ST population in the state
For Odisha with 22.85% ST population, this means at least 22.85% of the state plan outlay should be allocated to TSP
TSP funds should be spent on schemes that directly benefit tribal communities
Each department should allocate proportionate funds to TSP based on tribal population share

The principle is simple: if tribals are 22.85% of the population, they should receive at least 22.85% of development spending.

6.2 Allocation vs. Disbursement

The gap: Odisha consistently falls below the mandated 22.85% allocation line. While precise year-by-year figures are behind paywalled databases (IndiaSTAT), the pattern documented by multiple sources shows:

Actual TSP allocation has historically been below the 22.85% mandate
Even within allocated amounts, expenditure has been around 90% (2011-12 data), meaning 10% of already-insufficient funds go unspent
Expenditure quality is questionable — significant portions are spent on schemes with limited direct tribal benefit

6.3 How TSP Funds Get Diverted

The CAG and other oversight bodies have documented systematic diversion of TSP funds to non-tribal purposes:

Documented diversions in Odisha:

Flyover construction: Rs 6 crore of TSP funds diverted for flyover at Rajmahal Square, Bhubaneswar — a general infrastructure project with no specific tribal benefit
Canal improvement: Rs 5 crore diverted for improvement of Daya Canal on the city outskirts
Police modernisation: TSP funds allocated for modernisation of police barracks, residential buildings for police, and police training
Home department allocation: Rs 21.43 crore (2010) and Rs 16.92 crore (2011) to Home department
Industry department: Rs 10.79 crore (2010) and Rs 17.97 crore (2011) to Industry department — departments with “zero or least impact on tribal communities”

The CAG described these diversions as “highly irregular and completely inadmissible,” recommending a thorough investigation into “massive lapse in the budgetary control mechanism.”

Diversion mechanisms:

Departmental dumping: Departments with no tribal-relevant programmes receive TSP allocations to meet notional targets
General schemes relabelled: Mainstream development schemes are labelled as tribal schemes when they happen to operate in areas with tribal populations, regardless of whether tribals are the primary beneficiaries
Infrastructure projects: General infrastructure (roads, bridges, government buildings) in tribal areas is counted as TSP spending, even when tribals are not the primary users
Spending without tribal awareness: Communities are unaware that development funds designated for their benefit are being spent on unrelated projects

6.4 ST Commission Reports

The National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) has repeatedly flagged TSP implementation gaps:

NCST member Asha Lakra conducted a high-level review in Odisha (October 2025), reviewing implementation of central and state-sponsored schemes
The review covered FRA implementation (7.32 lakh IFR applications, 4.64 lakh granted), PESA implementation, and atrocity prevention
The Commission stressed the need for greater involvement of tribal communities in PESA’s effective execution
However, NCST findings and recommendations are advisory, not binding — limiting their impact

6.5 The Structural Problem with TSP

The Tribal Sub-Plan concept was redesigned in 2017 as the “Scheduled Tribe Component” (STC) of the central plan, with similar intent but persistent problems. The structural issue is threefold:

First, the definition of “tribal benefit” is elastic. A road built through a tribal area is counted as TSP/STC spending even if it primarily serves non-tribal commercial interests (such as mineral transport). A police station in a tribal district counts as TSP spending. The operational definition of “benefit to tribals” is so broad that virtually any government expenditure in a tribal-majority area qualifies.

Second, there is no outcome-linked accountability. TSP tracks inputs (allocations, expenditure) but not outcomes (did literacy improve? did malnutrition decrease? did land alienation slow?). A state can spend 100% of its TSP allocation and still see tribal indicators worsen if the spending goes to projects that do not actually benefit tribal communities.

Third, the tribal community has no say in prioritisation. TSP allocation decisions are made by departments at the state level. There is no mechanism for gram sabhas or tribal representatives to determine how TSP funds should be spent in their areas. This contradicts the spirit of PESA, which vests development planning authority in the gram sabha.

The 2017 redesign (STC): The shift from TSP to Scheduled Tribe Component was supposed to address some of these issues by requiring departments to identify specific schemes with quantifiable tribal beneficiaries. In practice, the relabelling has not changed the fundamental dynamic: departments continue to claim general expenditure as STC spending, and tribal communities continue to lack voice in how “their” funds are allocated.

A comparison that illuminates: The District Mineral Foundation (DMF) was created in 2015 to channel mining revenue back to mining-affected communities. DMF trusts in Odisha’s mining districts received substantial funds (e.g., Sundargarh DMF). But the CAG found that DMF funds were diverted to non-mining areas (Rs 136.77 crore for a hockey stadium) and projects were executed without Board of Trustees approval. When new funding streams are created specifically for tribal/mining-affected communities, they follow the same diversion pattern as TSP. The problem is not the design of individual schemes; it is the absence of genuine tribal power over resource allocation.

Confidence level: ~65%. Comprehensive, recent TSP allocation and disbursement data for Odisha is difficult to obtain publicly. The diversion examples are documented but the full scale of the problem is unclear from available sources.

Sources: India Together on TSP diversion; PRS on TSP; World Bank on tribal welfare; NCST review; Business Standard on DMF

7. Land Alienation Protections

7.1 The Legal Framework

Odisha Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes) Regulation, 1956

This regulation, which received President’s assent on September 2, 1956, is the primary legal instrument to protect tribal land in Odisha’s Scheduled Areas. Key provisions:

Prohibition on transfer: Transfer of immovable property by members of Scheduled Tribes to non-tribals is prohibited in Scheduled Areas
Penal provisions: Illegal and unauthorised transfers are punishable offences
2002 Amendment: A tribal may sell land to another tribal, but not to a non-tribal; mortgage of land allowed only to public financial institutions for agricultural purposes

Recent proposed amendment (2023): The Odisha government proposed a major change allowing ST members to sell land to non-tribals under certain conditions. This was met with strong tribal opposition and the decision was put on hold by the government. The proposed amendment would have undermined the core protective purpose of the 1956 Regulation.

7.2 How Tribal Land Is Still Lost

Despite legal prohibitions, tribal land alienation continues through multiple channels:

Benami (proxy) transactions: Non-tribals acquire tribal land through benami holders — often other tribals who are paid to act as fronts. The Supreme Court in Samatha noted that “non-tribals were able to find ways and means to circumvent the provisions… by entering into benami transactions and other clandestine transactions with unsophisticated tribals.”
Marriage to non-tribals: When a tribal woman marries a non-tribal man, land effectively transfers to a non-tribal household. This is technically legal but achieves the same result the law sought to prevent.
Debt and distress sales: Despite restrictions on money-lending, tribals take loans from informal sources and effectively lose land when unable to repay, even if formal ownership transfer is prohibited. The land remains in the tribal person’s name but is effectively controlled by the creditor.
Government acquisition: Land acquired by the government for “public purpose” (industrial projects, mining, infrastructure) is the largest single source of tribal land loss. The government acquires at below-market rates and transfers to industrial users. In Kalinganagar, IDCO acquired tribal land at Rs 15,000-30,000 per acre and sold to Tata Steel at Rs 3.5 lakh per acre.
Encroachment: Non-tribals encroach on tribal land, establish possession, and resist eviction. The legal process for restoring encroached land is slow and often ineffective.
Forest reservation: When forests are declared as Reserved Forests or Protected Areas, tribal communities who have lived there for generations may lose access and effective control even without formal land transfer.

7.3 Scale of Tribal Land Alienation

National data (Ministry of Rural Development, 2004-05):

Metric	Number
Cases of tribal land alienation registered (10 states)	3,75,164
Total area alienated	85,52,82 acres
Cases disposed in favour of tribals	1,62,650
Area restored to tribals	4,47,314 acres
Cases decided against tribals	1,54,993
Area lost by court decision	3,63,493 acres

Odisha-specific data:

Metric	Figure
Total area of tribal land alienated (by December 1999)	8,41,916.50 acres
Cases filed in court	1,04,742
Cases disposed by court	1,04,644
Cases disposed in favour of tribals	61,431
Area restored to tribals	56,854 acres
District with highest alienation	Koraput (28,901.55 acres)

The restoration deficit: Of approximately 8.4 lakh acres of alienated tribal land in Odisha, only about 56,854 acres have been restored — roughly 6.75%. Even among cases that went to court, only about 59% were decided in favour of tribals. This means that for every 100 acres of tribal land alienated, approximately 7 acres have been legally restored.

Note on data currency: These figures are from 1999-2005. More recent comprehensive data on tribal land alienation in Odisha is not readily available, which itself is a problem — you cannot address a problem you refuse to measure. The actual scale of alienation is almost certainly larger given the acceleration of mining and industrial projects in the 2000s and 2010s.

7.4 The 2023 Amendment Controversy

In November 2023, the then-BJD government of Naveen Patnaik proposed a significant amendment to the 1956 Regulation that would have allowed tribal members to sell their land to non-tribals under certain conditions. This provoked strong opposition:

What the amendment proposed:

Allowing STs to sell immovable property to non-tribals in Scheduled Areas, subject to specified conditions
The stated justification was to provide tribals “freedom to dispose of their assets” and “unlock economic value”

Why tribal organisations opposed it:

The amendment would effectively gut the core purpose of the 1956 Regulation — preventing tribal land alienation
Given existing power asymmetries (literacy gaps, economic disadvantage, information gaps), “freedom to sell” would translate into pressure to sell
Historical experience showed that wherever land transfer restrictions were weakened, tribal land alienation accelerated
The amendment would benefit land aggregators and corporations, not tribal communities

Outcome: The state government put the proposed amendment on hold following widespread tribal protests and civil society opposition. However, the fact that the amendment was proposed at all reveals the political economy of tribal land: the same government responsible for protecting tribal land from alienation periodically attempts to weaken that protection.

7.5 Land Alienation and the Mining Nexus

The most significant form of tribal land alienation in modern Odisha is not individual benami transactions but government-facilitated acquisition for industrial and mining projects. The key mechanism:

Government identifies tribal land for “public purpose” (industrial project)
Land acquired under Land Acquisition Act at below-market rates
Land transferred to industrial users (PSU or private) at market or above-market rates
Tribals receive cash compensation but lose their land-based livelihood permanently
Rehabilitation packages are inadequate and poorly implemented

The Kalinganagar example: IDCO acquired land at Rs 15,000-30,000/acre, sold to Tata at Rs 3.5 lakh/acre. The markup represents value extracted from tribal communities and transferred to the state and corporate interests.

The Niyamgiri example: 70 million tonnes of bauxite atop a mountain sacred to 8,000 Dongria Kondh. The mineral value at global prices would be in the tens of thousands of crores. The Dongria’s “value” of the mountain — as habitat, water source, and deity seat — is incalculable in economic terms but invisible to the acquisition framework.

This is not individual land alienation that protective regulation was designed to prevent. This is structural land alienation through the state apparatus itself — the very entity charged with tribal protection is the primary agent of tribal dispossession. The 1956 Regulation, the Fifth Schedule, and PESA are all designed to prevent private actors from taking tribal land. None of them effectively restrains the state itself.

Sources: Odisha Regulation 1956; Indian Tribal on land sale; Daily Pioneer on alienation; NYU Archive on land alienation; Springer on land alienation; Countercurrents on amendment

8. Institutional Framework

8.1 ST & SC Development Department, Government of Odisha

The ST & SC Development, Minorities and Backward Classes Welfare Department is the nodal department for tribal welfare in Odisha. It operates through:

Odisha Tribal Development Society (OTDS): Supporting planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of livelihood development interventions in tribal areas
SCSTRTI (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Research and Training Institute): Research and training institution headquartered in Bhubaneswar; maintains data on tribal communities, conducts research, publishes ethnographic studies
21 ITDAs: Field-level implementation agencies in 12 districts

Mandate vs. Reality: The department is simultaneously responsible for protecting tribal interests and facilitating “development” — two objectives that frequently conflict in Odisha’s mineral-rich tribal areas. The department’s ability to advocate for tribal rights is constrained by its position within a state government that depends on mining revenue from tribal areas. It functions more as a welfare delivery mechanism than as a rights enforcement body.

8.2 Integrated Tribal Development Agencies (ITDAs)

21 ITDAs in Odisha operate across 12 districts, covering 118 blocks with 50% or more ST population:

ITDA Location	District
Koraput	Koraput
Jeypore	Koraput
Malkangiri	Malkangiri
Nabarangpur	Nabarangpur
Rayagada	Rayagada
Gunupur	Rayagada
Th. Rampur	Kalahandi
Baripada	Mayurbhanj
Kaptipada	Mayurbhanj
Karanjia	Mayurbhanj
Rairangpur	Mayurbhanj
Sundergarh	Sundargarh
Bonai	Sundargarh
Panposh	Sundargarh
Keonjhar	Keonjhar
Champua	Keonjhar
Kuchinda	Sambalpur
Nilgiri	Balasore
Parlakhemundi	Gajapati
Balliguda	Kandhamal
Phulbani	Kandhamal

Funding structure: The scheme has two sectors:

Grant in Aid (GIA) — minimum 70% of total allocations
Creation of Capital Assets (CCA)

Functions: ITDAs are registered under the Registration of Societies Act, 1960, providing “greater decentralization and flexibility in decision-making.” They implement programmes in education, health, livelihood, and skill development.

Actual functioning: ITDAs suffer from:

Staff vacancies: Many ITDA positions remain unfilled for extended periods
Limited budgets: Allocations do not match the scale of need
Bureaucratic control: Despite being designed for decentralisation, ITDAs function under the district collector’s oversight and follow standard bureaucratic procedures
Scheme-driven rather than rights-driven: ITDAs focus on implementing specific government schemes rather than ensuring tribal rights are protected
Poor coordination: Limited coordination with Forest Department, Revenue Department, and Mining Department — the departments whose actions most affect tribal communities

8.3 National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST)

Constitutional mandate (Article 338A): The NCST was established through the 89th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 (effective 2004), bifurcating the earlier combined commission. Its mandate includes:

Investigating and monitoring matters relating to safeguards provided for STs
Inquiring into specific complaints regarding deprivation of rights
Advising on planning and socio-economic development of STs
Presenting annual reports to the President on working of safeguards

Functioning in relation to Odisha:

The NCST conducted a review meeting in Odisha in October 2025, examining FRA implementation, PESA compliance, and atrocity prevention
The Commission has repeatedly flagged PESA non-implementation and FRA processing delays
However, NCST recommendations are advisory, not binding — state governments can and do ignore them
The Commission lacks enforcement power: it can investigate, report, and recommend, but cannot compel action
NCST reports to Parliament are frequently delayed, reducing their relevance

8.4 PVTG-Specific Institutions

Each PVTG has a dedicated micro-project or development agency:

Institution	PVTG Served	Location
Bonda Development Agency	Bonda	Mudulipada, Malkangiri
Juang Development Agency	Juang	Keonjhar
DKDA (Dongria Kondh Development Agency)	Dongria Kondh	Chatikona, Rayagada
Kutia Kondh Development Agency	Kutia Kondh	Belghar, Kandhamal
Various micro-projects	Other PVTGs	Respective districts

These agencies have operated for decades (the Bonda Development Agency since 1976-77). Their track record, as documented in Section 5, raises fundamental questions about whether the institutional model itself is adequate. Development agencies staffed by non-tribal bureaucrats, operating from block headquarters, implementing standardised schemes in communities with 5-33% literacy and distinct cultural systems have achieved limited results over 50 years.

8.5 The Institutional Paradox

The institutional framework for tribal welfare in Odisha presents a paradox: the more institutions are created, the wider the gap between promise and reality seems to grow. Consider the institutional density:

At the constitutional level:

Fifth Schedule protections (since 1950)
Tribes Advisory Council (since 1950)
Governor’s regulatory powers

At the legislative level:

Land Transfer Regulation (1956)
PESA Act (1996, unimplemented)
Forest Rights Act (2006)
Prevention of Atrocities Act (1989)
RFCTLARR Act (2013)

At the institutional level:

ST & SC Development Department (state-level)
21 ITDAs across 12 districts
13 PVTG micro-projects/development agencies
SCSTRTI (research and training)
OTDS (tribal development society)
OPELIP (PVTG livelihoods programme)
National Commission for Scheduled Tribes
Tribal Welfare Commissioner

At the scheme level:

Tribal Sub-Plan
PM-JANMAN
Conservation-cum-Development Plans
Chief Minister’s Tribal Livelihood Mission
District Mineral Foundation trusts
Special Central Assistance to TSP
Grants under Article 275(1)

This is an extraordinary institutional architecture. A tribal person in Odisha’s Scheduled Areas is “protected” by at least four layers of constitutional provisions, five major legislative enactments, eight to ten institutional bodies, and multiple funding schemes.

And yet:

PVTG literacy ranges from 4.98% to 41.75% against a state average of 73%
Conviction rate for atrocities against STs: 0% (2019-2021)
8.4 lakh acres of tribal land alienated with only 6.75% restored
PESA rules unfinished after 27 years
43% of land acquisitions without gram sabha consent
FRA rejection rate for OTFDs: 99.77%

The institutional density itself may be part of the problem. Multiple overlapping institutions create diffusion of responsibility, jurisdictional confusion, and bureaucratic friction. No single institution is accountable for outcomes. Each can point to the others for failures. The ITDAs point to the Forest Department. The ST&SC Department points to the Revenue Department. The Revenue Department points to the courts. The courts point to the prosecution. The prosecution points to the police. The police point to “procedures followed.”

This is not a system designed for accountability. It is a system designed for the appearance of protection while permitting the continuation of extraction. The institutions exist to demonstrate that the state cares about tribal welfare; they do not exist to ensure tribal communities have power.

8.6 What the Odisha Tribal Population Looks Like

To understand the scale of the institutional gap, here are the basic demographic facts:

Metric	Data
Total ST population (Census 2011)	95,90,756
ST as % of state population	22.85% (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.2)
SC as % of state population	17.13% (Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.2)
ST as % of India’s tribal population	9.17% (3rd largest state)
Number of tribal communities	64 (post-2024 Amendment; Survey Ch. 9 §9.7.2)
Number of PVTGs	13 (highest in India)
PVTG population	~7,73,092
Districts with majority ST population	Mayurbhanj (58.72%), and others
Blocks with 50%+ ST population	118 blocks in 12 districts
Scheduled Areas as % of state land	44.71%

These are not small numbers or marginal communities. Nearly one in four people in Odisha is a tribal. Nearly half the state’s land is constitutionally designated as Scheduled Area. Thirteen of India’s most vulnerable indigenous groups live here. The constitutional promise is not for a fringe population — it is for a substantial segment of the state’s people living on nearly half its territory.

Sources: Odisha ST&SC Department; ITDA Rayagada; NCST Wikipedia; OPELIP; Census 2011

Synthesis: The Architecture of Unfulfilled Promises

The Constitutional Stack

India’s constitutional and legislative framework for tribal protection in Scheduled Areas is one of the most comprehensive in the world:

Layer	Instrument	Year	Status in Odisha
Constitutional	Fifth Schedule (Article 244)	1950	Nominally operational; Governor’s powers rarely exercised for tribal advocacy
Constitutional	Tribes Advisory Council	1950	Functional but advisory and ceremonial
Regulatory	Land Transfer Regulation	1956	In force but widely circumvented
Legislative	PESA Act	1996	Rules not finalised after 27+ years
Judicial	Samatha Judgment	1997	Routinely circumvented through state PSU proxies
Legislative	Forest Rights Act	2006	Partially implemented; 22% rejection rate; 99.7% OTFD rejection; CFR at ~5% of potential
Institutional	ITDAs (21)	1970s-80s	Operating but with limited effectiveness
Institutional	PVTG micro-projects	1976 onwards	50 years of operation; PVTG indicators remain dire
Policy	Tribal Sub-Plan	1974 onwards	Below-mandate allocation; funds diverted to non-tribal purposes

The Displacement Pattern: Kalinganagar and Beyond

The Kalinganagar incident of January 2, 2006 crystallises the constitutional gap. On that day, police opened fire on tribal people protesting the construction of a boundary wall for Tata Steel’s proposed mega steel plant in Jajpur district. Between 12 and 14 tribal persons were killed; one policeman also died.

What preceded the firing:

The Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation of Odisha (IDCO) had acquired land from tribals at Rs 15,000-30,000 per acre
The same land was transferred to Tata Steel at Rs 3.5 lakh per acre — a markup of 10-23x
Compensation packages offered to displaced families: 10 decimal plot in rehabilitation colony plus Rs 50,000 for a one-room pucca house
The tribals rejected these terms as inadequate

What followed:

An official enquiry commission declared the firing “justified”
No officer was prosecuted
The Tata Steel plant was delayed until 2010 but eventually commissioned in November 2015 (3 MTPA capacity, Rs 25,000 crore investment)
18 years later, displaced families are still fighting for land titles
Tribal communities observe the anniversary annually as a day of protest

Wider displacement pattern: Odisha’s tribal communities have faced displacement from multiple mega-projects, each following a similar pattern:

Project	Location	Company	Status	Tribal Impact
Kalinganagar Steel Plant	Jajpur	Tata Steel	Commissioned 2015	12-14 killed in firing; displacement ongoing
Niyamgiri Bauxite Mine	Rayagada/Kalahandi	Vedanta/OMC	Rejected by gram sabhas 2013	Dongria Kondh protected (rare success)
POSCO Steel Plant	Jagatsinghpur	POSCO (Korea)	Cancelled 2017	10+ years of resistance; Rs 51,000 crore project
UAIL (Utkal Alumina)	Kashipur, Rayagada	Hindalco/Alcan	Delayed/scaled down	Tribal displacement and resistance
Hirakud Dam	Sambalpur	Government	Completed 1957	150,000 displaced; 35% compensation paid
NALCO	Angul/Damanjodi	Government	Operational	Tribal land acquired

The Niyamgiri case stands out as the only major instance where the constitutional framework worked — but it required a Supreme Court order (2013) mandating gram sabha consent, after which all 12 gram sabhas voted unanimously against mining. This success was enabled by extraordinary factors: international NGO campaigns (Survival International), sustained media attention, and the Supreme Court’s willingness to enforce FRA provisions. Without any of these factors, the outcome would likely have been the same as Kalinganagar.

Atrocities Against Scheduled Tribes: The Enforcement Gap

The Prevention of Atrocities (POA) Act, 1989 provides criminal penalties for atrocities committed against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In Odisha:

Metric	Data
Cases registered against STs (2021)	676
ST atrocity cases as % of national total (2022)	7.94%
Conviction rate for crimes against STs (2019-2021)	0%
Increase in crimes against STs (murder and rape, 2021)	37.5% (murder), 28.4% (rape)

A 0% conviction rate from 2019 to 2021 is perhaps the single most damning statistic in this entire research. It means that despite hundreds of cases being registered, not a single perpetrator of atrocities against Scheduled Tribes in Odisha was convicted over a three-year period. The law exists. Cases are filed. But the judicial and prosecutorial system fails completely to deliver justice.

This conviction rate exists in a state where tribal communities are 22.85% of the population, where 44.71% of land is under the Fifth Schedule, where 21 ITDAs operate, where multiple constitutional and legislative protections exist. The gap between the volume of institutional architecture and the quality of actual protection is staggering.

Sources: Down to Earth on Kalinganagar; NewsClick on enquiry report; Land Conflict Watch on displacement; SabrangIndia on atrocity data; Academia on POA in Odisha

The Pattern

The pattern that emerges is not one of ignorance or absence of policy. India’s tribal protection architecture is elaborate, multi-layered, and constitutionally grounded. The pattern is one of systematic non-implementation:

Laws exist but rules are not framed (PESA: 27 years without rules)
Rights are recognised but claims are rejected (FRA: 94% re-rejection rate; 99.77% OTFD rejection)
Institutions exist but lack teeth (NCST: advisory only; TAC: ceremonial)
Funds are allocated but diverted (TSP: police barracks, flyovers, canals)
Protections exist but are circumvented (Samatha: state PSU proxies; Land Regulation: benami transactions)
Development agencies exist but indicators don’t improve (BDA since 1976; Bonda literacy still 33%)
Consent is required but bypassed (CAG: 43% of land acquisitions without gram sabha consent)

What Would Have to Change

For the constitutional promise to become ground reality, the following structural changes would be necessary:

Finalise PESA rules with genuine gram sabha veto power over land acquisition and mining — not just “consultation”
Enforce Samatha by ending the state PSU proxy model for mining in Scheduled Areas
Process all pending FRA claims with proper evidence support and due process
Ring-fence TSP funds with independent audit and tribal community oversight
Strengthen NCST from advisory to enforcement body
Measure tribal land alienation — current data is from 1999; no updated survey exists
Transform PVTG development agencies from scheme-delivery machines to rights-based institutions with tribal leadership

Each of these changes threatens a vested interest: mining companies, the forest bureaucracy, the revenue department, the political establishment, or the state’s fiscal model itself. This is why the gap between constitutional promise and ground reality has persisted for seven decades. The architecture of protection is designed to look like protection while permitting extraction.

Confidence level on this synthesis: ~80%. The pattern is strongly supported by multiple independent data sources, but comprehensive recent data (particularly on TSP allocation, land alienation, and gram sabha functioning) is limited, and the situation may vary significantly across districts and communities.

Data Gaps and Contradictions

The following significant data gaps were encountered during this research:

Data Point	Issue
Total TSP allocation as % of state plan (recent years)	Behind paywalled databases; publicly available data is from 2010-12
Comprehensive tribal land alienation survey (post-1999)	No updated survey conducted in 25+ years
District-wise FRA rejection data (all 30 districts)	Available only for sampled districts in CAG audit
PVTG population (post-2011 Census)	Census 2021 not conducted; 2011 data is 15 years old
TAC meeting minutes and recommendations	Not publicly accessible
Governor’s annual reports to President on Scheduled Areas	Not publicly accessible
TSP fund flow tracking to end beneficiaries	No transparent tracking system
PESA compliance audit (all Scheduled Area blocks)	Only partial audits conducted

Sources where data is contradictory:

PVTG population figures vary significantly between PMC study, Census abstract data, and SCSTRTI publications. The discrepancy may arise from whether broader tribal groups or specific PVTG-designated sub-groups are counted.
FRA acceptance rates: Ministry of Tribal Affairs dashboard shows 72% acceptance for Odisha, but ground-level studies show significant “partial approval” (approved for fraction of claimed area) counted as full approvals.
The “136 violations” figure referenced in project materials: The CAG report documents 126 cases (not 136) of land acquisition without proper gram sabha consent. The “136” may refer to Rs 136.77 crore in DMF fund diversion, or to a broader tally across audit categories not captured in the chapter-level report.

Source Index

Government and Institutional Sources

Judicial Sources

Academic and Research Sources

Journalism and NGO Sources

Note on Methodology and Limitations

This research was compiled from publicly available sources including government reports, CAG audits, Supreme Court judgments, peer-reviewed academic studies, investigative journalism, and NGO documentation. The following methodological limitations should be noted:

Census data staleness: India’s most recent Census was conducted in 2011 (Census 2021 was postponed and has not been conducted as of 2026). All population figures for tribal communities are 15 years old. Actual populations may have changed significantly, particularly for smaller PVTGs where demographic trends (declining fertility, outward migration, or natural increase) could alter numbers substantially.
Self-reporting bias: Government data on FRA implementation, TSP spending, and PESA compliance comes from the same administrative machinery responsible for implementation. Self-reported data may systematically overstate compliance. The CAG audit, as an independent verification, found significantly worse performance than government-reported figures.
District-level variation: State-level averages mask enormous variation across districts. FRA implementation in Koraput may be qualitatively different from implementation in Balasore’s Nilagiri block. This research uses state-level data where district-level data was unavailable, but the ground reality varies significantly across Odisha’s Scheduled Areas.
Survivorship bias in case studies: The cases that receive public attention (Niyamgiri, Kalinganagar) are by definition exceptional — they attracted media coverage, legal intervention, and public outrage. Hundreds of smaller land acquisitions, displacement events, and rights violations occur without documentation. The documented cases are the tip of a much larger iceberg.
Source availability: Several key documents are behind paywalls (IndiaSTAT for TSP data), not publicly accessible (Governor’s annual reports to the President on Scheduled Areas, TAC meeting minutes), or available only in Odia (state government notifications and orders). This research is constrained by what is publicly accessible in English.

Despite these limitations, the core findings — systematic non-implementation of PESA, high FRA rejection rates, tribal land alienation, PVTG development deficits, and the circumvention of Samatha — are corroborated across multiple independent sources (government audits, academic studies, NGO reports, and journalistic investigations). The convergence of evidence from these diverse sources provides high confidence in the overall pattern, even where individual data points may have margins of error.

Research compiled for SeeUtkal reference library. All factual claims are sourced. Claims with confidence below 70% are flagged. Data gaps are documented. This document is a reference compilation, not a published analysis.

Cited in

The narrative series that build on this research.

Narrative series Tribal Odisha The parallel civilisation — 62 communities, pre-colonial governance, displacement, identity under modernity.