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Mining, Displacement, and Resistance in Tribal Odisha

Comprehensive Research Reference

Compiled: 2026-04-02 Scope: Mineral extraction on tribal land, major displacement conflicts (POSCO, Vedanta/Niyamgiri, Kalinganagar, UAIL/Kashipur), cumulative displacement since 1950, rehabilitation failures, the state as extraction agent, and District Mineral Foundation governance. Target audience: SeeUtkal analytical content; not for direct publication. Approximate length: ~12,000 words

1. The Structural Pattern: Minerals Under Tribal Land

1.1 Odisha’s Mineral Endowment

Odisha is among the most mineral-rich states in India. Its share of national reserves is disproportionate to its geographic size (4.74% of India’s land area):

MineralOdisha’s Share of India’s ReservesEstimated Reserve (Odisha)Primary Districts
Chromite95-98%~111 million tonnesJajpur (Sukinda valley), Dhenkanal, Keonjhar
Nickel~92%Data limitedJajpur (Sukinda), Keonjhar
Bauxite49-59%~1,530 million tonnesKoraput, Rayagada, Kalahandi, Sundargarh, Keonjhar
Iron Ore28-33%Substantial (exact figure varies by source)Keonjhar, Sundargarh, Mayurbhanj, Jajpur
Coal~24%~51,571 million tonnesAngul (Talcher), Jharsuguda (Ib Valley)
ManganeseSignificant (national rank 1-2)~116 million tonnesSundargarh, Keonjhar, Rayagada, Balangir

The total value of minerals produced in Odisha is the highest in the country. Odisha’s share in India’s total mineral production value was approximately 11.89% as of recent data. By 2023-24, Odisha contributed 45% of India’s major mineral production by volume.

The mineral production value reached Rs 87,086 crore (US$ 10.78 billion) in 2021-22. Coal, bauxite, chromite, iron ore, manganese ore, and limestone together contributed approximately 99% of total mineral production value.

The mineral sector recorded an annual compound growth rate of 21.4% between 2017-18 and 2023-24 — the highest among major mineral-producing states in India.

Sources:

1.2 The Overlap: Mineral-Rich Districts and Scheduled Areas

Odisha has 62 recognized Scheduled Tribes, constituting approximately 22.84% of the state’s total population (Census 2011). Under the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, Odisha has:

Fully Scheduled Districts (7):

  • Mayurbhanj
  • Sundargarh
  • Koraput
  • Malkangiri
  • Nabarangpur
  • Rayagada
  • (Note: The original Presidential Order of 1977 listed the undivided Koraput district, which was later divided into Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, and Rayagada)

Partially Scheduled Districts (6):

  • Keonjhar (Keonjhar, Telkoi, Champua, Barbil tahasils)
  • Kandhamal/Phulbani (Khondamal, Balliguda, G.Udayagiri tahasils)
  • Ganjam (R.Udayagiri tahasil, Gumma and Rayagada blocks, Suruda tahasil partially)
  • Kalahandi (Thuamul Rampur and Lanjigarh blocks)
  • Sambalpur (Kuchinda tahasil)
  • Balasore (Nilagiri block)

Approximately half of Odisha’s geographical area falls within Fifth Schedule territory.

The critical overlap: The districts with the richest mineral deposits are almost entirely tribal-majority or contain significant tribal populations within Scheduled Areas:

Mineral BeltKey DistrictsScheduled Area StatusMajor Tribal Communities
Iron Ore BeltKeonjhar, Sundargarh, MayurbhanjKeonjhar: partially; Sundargarh & Mayurbhanj: fully scheduledHo, Santhal, Munda, Bhuyan, Juang, Kolha
Chromite BeltJajpur (Sukinda), KeonjharKeonjhar: partially; Jajpur: not scheduled but significant tribal populationBhuyan, Juang, Santal
Bauxite BeltKoraput, Rayagada, KalahandiKoraput & Rayagada: fully; Kalahandi: partially scheduledKondh (Dongria, Kutia), Paraja, Gadaba, Bonda
Coal BeltAngul, JharsugudaNot formally scheduled (but tribal populations affected)Various
Manganese BeltSundargarh, KeonjharSundargarh: fully; Keonjhar: partially scheduledBhuyan, Munda, Oraon

More than 50% of the state’s tribal population resides in six districts: Mayurbhanj (15.43% of state ST population), Sundargarh (11.08%), Keonjhar (8.54%), Koraput (7.27%), Nabarangpur (7.10%), and Rayagada (5.65%). These six districts are also the primary mineral extraction zones.

This is not coincidence. The geological formation that created mineral deposits — the Eastern Ghats and the Singhbhum Craton — also created the terrain that was historically resistant to state penetration, enabling tribal communities to maintain autonomous governance systems for millennia. The minerals are under tribal land because the same geological and geographical conditions that concentrated minerals also created the forested, hilly terrain where tribal communities lived beyond the reach of plains-based kingdoms.

Sources:

1.3 Mining Revenue vs. Impact on Tribal Communities

Revenue to the State

Mining constitutes a structural pillar of Odisha’s fiscal health. Key data points:

  • Non-tax revenue from mining constitutes approximately 6-8% of GSDP, compared to the national average of approximately 1.3% for state governments.
  • In 2021-22, the state observed a fiscal surplus primarily due to a 171% increase in its own non-tax revenue, mainly from mining.
  • Mining revenue for 2022-23 was estimated at Rs 43,444 crore from fees, rents, and royalties alone.
  • Mining contributed an estimated 6.31% to GSDP directly, though its downstream impact on the secondary sector (steel, aluminium) is substantially larger.
  • The mineral production value crossed Rs 87,086 crore in 2021-22.

Revenue from Mining Lease Auctions (2020 onwards)

Following the MMDR Amendment Act of 2015, expired mining leases were auctioned. In Odisha, 25 blocks were auctioned in 2019-20 alone, generating unprecedented premiums:

  • Average winning premiums stood at approximately 104% above the floor price.
  • Most iron ore auctions saw winning bids above 100% premium, with some reaching 144% (Guali block, won by JSPL).
  • The Sukinda chromite block was won by Tata Steel subsidiary TS Alloys at a 93.7% premium.

However, a CAG report flagged that the decline in iron ore grade had a revenue implication of approximately Rs 4,162.77 crore for 2020-21 and 2021-22 in the form of lesser royalty and premium.

What Reaches Tribal Communities

The gap between state revenue earned from mining and benefits reaching mining-affected tribal communities is stark:

  • Of the total mineral value chain, the state captures approximately 3.7-9.2% through royalties, DMF, and levies (per SeeUtkal’s value-chain research).
  • Rehabilitation and resettlement rates for displaced communities remain at approximately 35% (see Section 7).
  • DMF funds — specifically designed to benefit mining-affected communities — show significant diversion to non-mining areas (see Section 9).

Sources:

2. POSCO (Jagatsinghpur, 2005-2017)

2.1 The Project

South Korea’s POSCO (Pohang Steel Company) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Odisha in June 2005 to set up what was then proposed as the largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) project in Indian history:

  • Investment: US$ 12 billion (approximately Rs 52,000 crore at 2005 exchange rates)
  • Capacity: 12 million tonnes per annum (MTPA) integrated steel plant
  • Location: Jagatsinghpur district, near the port town of Paradip
  • Land requirement: 4,004 acres across villages including Dhinkia, Nuagaon, and Gadakujanga
  • Additional components: Captive port at Jatadhari, captive mines in Keonjhar district
  • Projected employment: 13,000 direct jobs plus indirect employment

Critical distinction: Jagatsinghpur is NOT a tribal-majority district and is NOT a Scheduled Area. The affected population consisted primarily of betel vine (paan) farmers, paddy cultivators, cashew orchardists, and fishing communities. This case is included for its precedent value in demonstrating resistance patterns, environmental clearance controversies, and the limits of state-facilitated corporate land acquisition in Odisha, rather than as a tribal displacement case.

2.2 Timeline

YearEvent
June 2005MoU signed between POSCO and Government of Odisha
August 2005POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti (PPSS) formed to resist the project
2005-2006Resistance intensifies; villages barricade access roads
September 2006POSCO applies for environmental clearance for captive port
April 2007Environmental clearance granted for steel plant and captive power plant
May 2007Environmental clearance granted for captive port
July 2010Odisha High Court cancels mining lease for iron ore mine allocated to POSCO
July 2010Ministry of Environment constitutes Meena Gupta Committee
October 2010Meena Gupta Committee report recommends cancellation of environmental clearance, citing Forest Rights Act violations
January 2011Final environmental clearance granted (despite Meena Gupta recommendations)
May 2011Forest clearance granted
December 2011Violence erupts during construction of coastal road; one killed, 25 injured
March 2012National Green Tribunal (NGT) suspends environmental clearance
2013POSCO scales down planned capacity from 12 MTPA to 8 MTPA
April 2013Bomb explosion kills four anti-POSCO protesters during land acquisition attempts
2015New mining law requires POSCO to acquire mining license through auction (previously promised free by state)
2015-2016Global steel glut and falling prices make project economically unviable
March 2017POSCO formally surrenders 2,700 acres of land and withdraws from project

2.3 The Resistance: PPSS and Betel Vine Farmers

The POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti (PPSS — POSCO Resistance Struggle Committee) was formed in August 2005, immediately after the MoU was signed. The resistance was anchored in the economic reality of betel vine cultivation:

  • The betel vine economy sustained approximately 20,000 people across eight affected villages.
  • Betel vine (paan patra) cultivation on the sandy coastal soil near Paradip was a generations-old livelihood, with annual income significantly exceeding what compensation packages offered.
  • Fishing communities along the coast faced loss of access to the sea.
  • The fertile agricultural strip along the Bay of Bengal supported paddy farming and cashew orchards.

The PPSS maintained physical blockades of access roads to the project site for years. Villages became no-go zones for government officials and POSCO surveyors. Women played a prominent role in the resistance, forming human chains and confronting police.

2.4 The Meena Gupta Committee

The Ministry of Environment and Forests constituted a special four-member committee chaired by former Environment Secretary Meena Gupta on July 29, 2010, to examine relief and rehabilitation as well as settlement of rights under the Forest Rights Act in the POSCO area.

Key findings of the Meena Gupta Committee:

  • The environmental clearance had been granted without proper assessment of the project’s impact.
  • Forest Rights Act provisions had not been complied with.
  • Individual and community forest rights of residents had not been settled before land acquisition.
  • The committee recommended reconsideration of the environmental clearance.

Despite these findings, the Ministry of Environment granted final environmental clearance in January 2011 and forest clearance in May 2011, effectively overriding its own expert committee’s recommendations. The National Green Tribunal subsequently suspended the environmental clearance in March 2012.

2.5 Why POSCO Failed: Resistance, Prices, or Both?

The collapse of the POSCO project resulted from a convergence of factors:

  1. Sustained community resistance (2005-2017): Twelve years of organized opposition prevented land acquisition from reaching completion. The PPSS demonstrated that determined local resistance could stall even the largest foreign investment.

  2. Global steel market collapse: From 2013 onward, a global steel glut driven primarily by Chinese overproduction depressed steel prices. POSCO itself faced financial difficulties in its home market.

  3. Regulatory environment changes: The MMDR Amendment Act of 2015 required mining licenses to be auctioned rather than allocated. The Odisha government had promised POSCO a free mining license for iron ore in Keonjhar; this promise became legally impossible to fulfill.

  4. Escalating costs: Delays inflated project costs. Environmental compliance requirements increased. The combination of higher costs and lower steel prices destroyed the project’s economic rationale.

  5. Land Acquisition Act 2013: The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 made land acquisition more expensive and procedurally complex.

The honest assessment: resistance alone did not kill POSCO, and market forces alone did not kill it. The resistance created the delay, and the delay allowed market conditions to deteriorate to the point where the project became unviable. Had POSCO been able to acquire land quickly in 2005-2007, it would likely have been built before the 2013 steel price collapse. The resistance bought time, and time changed the economics.

2.6 After POSCO: The JSW Sequel

The land acquired for POSCO did not revert to the original inhabitants. In 2018, the Odisha government allocated 2,700 acres of the former POSCO site to JSW Utkal Steel Ltd for a new steel plant:

  • Investment: Rs 65,000 crore
  • Foundation stone: Laid by then-Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik on February 16, 2024
  • Opposition: Dhinkia villagers resumed resistance, with the same betel vine farmers opposing the new project
  • Violence: On January 14, 2022, police used lathi-charge on villagers opposing demolition of their betel vineyards; over 20 injured
  • International attention: In November 2025, UN Special Rapporteurs issued a communication to JSW Steel flagging serious allegations of human rights violations affecting over 30,000 people — primarily Adivasis, forest dwellers, Dalits, and fishing communities
  • NGT intervention: The National Green Tribunal scrapped the environmental clearance for the JSW project, though this was later contested

The JSW project represents a pattern: when one project fails due to resistance, the state reallocates the same land to a different corporation rather than returning it to the communities that fought for it.

Sources:

3. Vedanta/Niyamgiri (Dongria Kondh, 2004-2013)

3.1 The Project and the Company

Vedanta Resources, a London-listed mining conglomerate controlled by Anil Agarwal, operated through its subsidiary Sterlite Industries (later Vedanta Limited) to build an alumina refinery at Lanjigarh in Kalahandi district, commissioned in 2008. The refinery was designed to process bauxite from the Niyamgiri Hills, which straddle the border of Kalahandi and Rayagada districts.

  • Refinery location: Lanjigarh, Kalahandi district
  • Designed capacity: 1 MTPA alumina (later expanded to 2 MTPA in plans)
  • Proposed bauxite source: Niyamgiri Hills — estimated 73 million tonnes of bauxite
  • Mining area: Approximately 660 hectares on the Niyamgiri plateau

3.2 The Dongria Kondh

The Dongria Kondh (also spelled Dangaria Kandha) are a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG) inhabiting the Niyamgiri Hills:

  • Population: Approximately 8,000-10,000 people across roughly 100 villages
  • Location: Niyamgiri Hills, at elevations between 500-1,500 meters, across Kalahandi and Rayagada districts
  • Self-identification: They call themselves “Jharnia” — protectors of the streams
  • Livelihood: Shifting cultivation (podu) on mountain slopes using a sophisticated agro-forestry rotation system; collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs); cultivation of fruits including jackfruit, mango, and pineapple on forest plots. Their economy is deeply integrated with the forest ecosystem.
  • Sacred geography: The Niyamgiri Hills are the abode of Niyam Raja (the “King of Law” or “Giver of Law”), the supreme deity of the Dongria Kondh. The highest peak, Niyam Dongar (“Mountain of the Law”), is considered particularly sacred. The Dongria Kondh believe their right to cultivate the mountain slopes was conferred by Niyam Raja, and that they are his royal descendants.
  • Ecological role: The Niyamgiri Hills host over 300 perennial streams that serve as water sources for the Vamsadhara and Nagavali river systems, supporting agriculture in the plains below. The Dongria Kondh’s land management practices maintain these watersheds.

3.3 Timeline

YearEvent
2002Vedanta/Sterlite begins construction of Lanjigarh alumina refinery
2004Mining proposal for Niyamgiri Hills submitted; environmental clearance process begins
2007Refinery commissioned at Lanjigarh (without Niyamgiri ore; sourcing from alternative mines)
2007-2008CEC (Central Empowered Committee of Supreme Court) recommends rejection of mining clearance
August 2008Supreme Court allows mining (2:1 majority), subject to conditions; Justice Bharucha dissents
2009-2010Survival International launches international “Mine — Vedanta’s True Face” campaign
November 2010Church of England divests from Vedanta on ethical grounds
August 2010Ministry of Environment and Forests (Jairam Ramesh as Minister) rejects Vedanta’s mining proposal, citing “complete contempt for environmental norms”
April 18, 2013Supreme Court landmark judgment: directs gram sabha consultations on whether mining affects community rights under Forest Rights Act
July-August 201312 gram sabhas conducted across Niyamgiri
August 19, 2013All 12 gram sabhas unanimously reject mining
January 2014Ministry of Environment and Forests formally rejects mining proposal
February 2016Odisha Mining Corporation (OMC) challenges gram sabha resolutions in Supreme Court; Court rejects the challenge

3.4 The Landmark Supreme Court Order (April 18, 2013)

The case — Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment and Forest and Others — produced one of the most significant judgments in Indian environmental and tribal law. Key principles established:

  1. Gram sabha authority over forest rights: The Court held that the gram sabha has authority to determine whether a proposed project would affect individual or community rights — including cultural and religious rights — under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. This was established as a precondition before mining could proceed.

  2. Cultural and religious rights as forest rights: The Court concluded that cultural and religious rights form part of the forest rights of the people of the Niyamgiri Hills. This was a significant expansion of the scope of the Forest Rights Act.

  3. State as trustee: The Court clarified that the state holds natural resources as a trustee of the people; local populations must give consent to extraction of these resources.

  4. Silence on “national interest in mining”: Notably, the judgment contains no reference to “the national interest in mining,” “development projects,” or the “need” to mine. The framing was entirely about rights, not about balancing rights against development.

  5. Procedural precedent: The direction to conduct gram sabha consultations before forest diversion was unprecedented and created a procedural mechanism that could, in theory, be applied to other mining projects in Scheduled Areas.

3.5 The Twelve Gram Sabhas

Between July and August 2013, twelve gram sabhas were conducted in villages around the Niyamgiri Hills. Despite heavy police presence and persistent threats, all twelve unanimously rejected mining. The votes were conducted under the supervision of the district judiciary as directed by the Supreme Court.

This was effectively India’s first environmental referendum conducted under judicial supervision. The unanimity was absolute — not a single dissenting vote was recorded across all twelve villages.

3.6 Post-2013: Has the Victory Held?

The Niyamgiri decision has held, but the broader situation is mixed:

Niyamgiri itself: The Niyamgiri Hills remain unmineable as of 2026. In February 2016, the Supreme Court rejected OMC’s petition challenging the gram sabha resolutions, reaffirming its 2013 judgment.

The Lanjigarh refinery’s ore crisis: Without Niyamgiri bauxite, the refinery has operated significantly below capacity. Vedanta was forced to source bauxite from Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, and international markets (including New Guinea), losing an estimated Rs 3-4 crore daily on transport costs. The refinery capacity was cut by 50%, putting 600 jobs at stake.

The Sijimali/Tijmali sequel: Unable to access Niyamgiri, Vedanta won the auction for the Sijimali bauxite block in February 2023 — a 1,548.79-hectare lease across Kalahandi and Rayagada districts, with capacity of 9 MTPA. This is approximately twice the area of the original Niyamgiri project. Since August 2023, local tribal communities (Kondh and Damba) have been protesting, alleging that gram sabha resolutions consenting to forest diversion were fraudulently obtained. Between August 30 and September 4, 2024, affected villages held fresh gram sabhas and unanimously rejected the mining lease. In July 2025, the Union government temporarily halted forest clearance after evidence surfaced that consent may have been forged. Activists opposing the Sijimali project have been charged under the UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act).

The Dongria Kondh community: Despite the legal victory, the community continues to face challenges. Government facilities and services remain distant. The community reports ongoing pressure from surveillance and police presence. The mental and emotional toll of sustained uncertainty persists.

The Niyamgiri case established several precedents in Indian law:

  1. Gram sabha consent as mandatory precondition for forest diversion in Scheduled Areas, not merely a consultative requirement.
  2. Cultural and religious rights recognized as part of the forest rights framework, expanding the Forest Rights Act beyond land tenure.
  3. Community veto power over mining — the first time Indian law effectively gave a tribal community the power to reject an industrial project through a democratic vote.
  4. International precedent: The case has been cited globally as a model for indigenous consent mechanisms (comparable in significance to the Sarayaku case in Ecuador).

Confidence note (Principle 7): The legal precedents from Niyamgiri are strong on paper. However, the Sijimali episode demonstrates that the state and corporations can attempt to circumvent these precedents through alleged manipulation of the gram sabha process itself. The protection is only as strong as the integrity of the consent mechanism. Confidence that these legal protections will consistently hold: approximately 55-60%.

Sources:

4. Kalinganagar (2006 Police Firing)

4.1 Background

Kalinganagar in Jajpur district was designated as an industrial growth center by the Odisha government. Multiple steel companies were allocated land in the area, with Tata Steel receiving 2,400 acres for a 6 MTPA integrated steel plant.

The affected communities were predominantly tribal — Ho, Munda, Bhuyan, and Juang communities who had been cultivating the land for generations. The land acquisition process offered compensation at rates far below the market value of agricultural land, and inadequate rehabilitation provisions.

4.2 The Firing: January 2, 2006

On January 2, 2006, approximately 1,000 villagers gathered with traditional weapons (lathis, axes, bows and arrows) to protest the construction of a boundary wall by Tata Steel. Twelve platoons of police (over 500 armed personnel) were stationed at the site.

The police opened fire on the protesters. The official death toll was 13 tribals (11 men, 3 women) and one policeman. Some reports cite 14 tribal deaths. Multiple others were injured.

The violence was characterized by extreme brutality. Reports from Amnesty International and other human rights organizations documented:

  • Bodies of slain tribals were mutilated — hands were reportedly severed from at least some victims
  • The police action was disproportionate to any threat posed
  • The firing continued even as people attempted to flee

4.3 Aftermath

  • National outrage: The incident drew nationwide condemnation. Opposition parties demanded accountability.
  • CBI investigation: A CBI probe was demanded but the state government established a Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Pradyumna Kumar Mohanty.
  • Inquiry Commission: Appointed on February 4, 2006, with a six-month tenure that was repeatedly extended until July 3, 2015 — nearly a decade. The commission submitted its report, but the government accepted it only on June 8, 2016. The report gave a “clean chit” to the state government and law enforcement agencies, provoking anger among civil society groups and rights activists.
  • Compensation: Enhanced compensation packages were eventually offered to displaced families. But compensation alone does not address the structural violence.

4.4 Current Status

The Tata Steel plant:

  • The plant was eventually built and commissioned. Phase I (3 MTPA capacity) was operational by 2016.
  • Phase II expansion (additional 5 MTPA) was completed in September 2024, with the commissioning of India’s largest blast furnace (BF2, volume 5,870 cubic meters), at a total investment of Rs 27,000 crore.
  • Total capacity at Kalinganagar now stands at 8 MTPA.
  • Tata Steel has invested over Rs 100,000 crore in Odisha over the last decade, making Odisha its largest investment destination.

The displaced communities:

  • Approximately 5,000 tribals were displaced from their land for the steel plant.
  • Over 307 families rehabilitated in Gobarghati Colony since 2007 still lack land titles (pattas), denying them access to government welfare schemes.
  • Many displaced persons have been unable to find employment in the steel plant.
  • Displaced communities continue to face challenges regarding housing, environmental pollution from the plant, and access to government benefits.
  • On January 2 of each year, tribal communities and anti-displacement leaders congregate at Birabhumi (the Martyrs’ Tower) to observe the anniversary.

4.5 The Broader Kalinganagar/Jajpur Industrial Corridor

The Kalinganagar incident was not an isolated event but part of a broader pattern of industrial acquisition in Jajpur district:

  • Multiple steel plants have been allocated land in the Kalinganagar-Duburi industrial complex
  • The Sukinda Valley in Jajpur hosts 95% of India’s chromite deposits, making the district simultaneously one of the most mineral-rich and most polluted areas in the state
  • Sukinda was ranked as the fourth most polluted place in the world by the Blacksmith Institute in 2007, due to hexavalent chromium contamination of groundwater from mining operations

Sources:

5. UAIL/Utkal Alumina (Kashipur, Rayagada)

5.1 The Project

Utkal Alumina International Limited (UAIL) — originally a joint venture between Indian Aluminium Company (Indal/Hindalco), Tata Industries, and Norway’s Norsk Hydro — proposed a bauxite mining and alumina refining project in Kashipur block, Rayagada district:

  • Mining location: Baphlimali Hills, Kashipur block
  • Refinery location: Doragurha, Kashipur block
  • Tribal communities affected: Kondh (Kutia Kondh, Paraja) and other tribal groups
  • Villages impacted: At least 24 villages faced displacement

5.2 The Maikanch Massacre (December 16, 2000)

On December 15-16, 2000, approximately 4,000 tribal activists blocked an All-Party Committee meeting in Maikanch village. The next day, three platoons of police entered the village and began harassing women and children. When men emerged to protect them, police fired 19 rounds, killing three people:

  • Abilhas Jhoda, age 25
  • Raghu Jhoda, age 18
  • Damodar Jhoda, age 43

This was one of the earliest instances of lethal state violence against mining resistance in post-liberalization Odisha. The Maikanch incident established a pattern that would recur at Kalinganagar in 2006: armed state force used against unarmed tribal protesters opposing land acquisition for corporate projects.

5.3 Timeline of Resistance and Project Execution

The Kucheipadar tribal movement against UAIL began in 1996, when the project was first proposed. The resistance sustained for over 12 years, during which the company could not lay a single brick at the project site despite strong support from the state government.

Key developments:

  • 1996: Project proposed; resistance begins immediately
  • December 2000: Maikanch firing — three tribals killed
  • 2001-2004: Continued resistance; multiple arrests of community leaders
  • 2004: Brutal police action reported against tribals in Kashipur; the state government deployed force to enable construction
  • Partner withdrawals: Both Tata Industries and Norsk Hydro withdrew from the project, partly due to human rights concerns raised by the resistance
  • Post-withdrawals: The project was reconstituted under Hindalco Industries (Aditya Birla Group)
  • 2013-14: The greenfield alumina refinery was finally commissioned with a capacity of 1.5 MTPA
  • 2021: Expanded to 2.12 MTPA
  • Current status: Operational with captive Baphlimali bauxite mines (8 MTPA capacity), mining lease valid until February 2048, captive co-generation power plant of 90 MW plus 5 MW solar

5.4 Current Status of Displaced Communities

Despite more than 18 years of bauxite mining operations:

  • Displaced and project-affected people have continued agitations demanding basic civic amenities
  • Communities allege that promises of development remain unfulfilled
  • Access to education, healthcare, drinking water, housing, and road connectivity is reportedly still lacking in affected villages
  • The company has allegedly failed to provide permanent jobs to eligible displaced families and has discontinued allowances promised earlier
  • Community members have demanded a 0.01% equity share in UAIL

The UAIL case demonstrates the pattern most starkly: resistance can delay a project but cannot permanently prevent it if the state commits sufficient force. The three deaths at Maikanch, the partner withdrawals, and the decade-plus delay were ultimately insufficient to stop the project. The refinery operates; the displaced communities remain marginalized.

Sources:

6. Cumulative Displacement Since 1950

6.1 Total Displacement Estimates

The total number of people displaced by development projects in Odisha since independence is contested, with different methodologies producing different estimates. The available data:

Source/PeriodEstimated DisplacementOf Which Tribal (%)
Walter Fernandes (1951-1995)~1.5 million people~42%
Broader estimates (1950-2000)3-5 million people>50%
Scholarly literature (tribal-specific, 1951-1995)2,155,317 tribals displaced; 360,999 tribals affected—
National context (1947-2000, all India)>60 million people>40% tribal

Note on data quality: These figures are estimates compiled from multiple sources, NGO reports, academic studies, and government data (where available). Official government records systematically undercount displacement. Walter Fernandes and other researchers have noted that the absence of a national displacement database makes precise figures impossible. The 3-5 million range for Odisha is widely cited but should be treated as an order-of-magnitude estimate rather than a precise count. Confidence: approximately 65%.

The disproportionality: Tribals constitute approximately 22.84% of Odisha’s population but account for over 40-50% of all development-displaced persons. At the national level, Walter Fernandes estimates that tribals — 8% of India’s population — account for 40% of all development-displaced persons. The reasons are structural: (a) mineral deposits and dam sites are disproportionately located in forested, hilly terrain historically inhabited by tribal communities; (b) tribal land tenure is often poorly documented, making acquisition procedurally easier; (c) tribal communities have the least political representation and bargaining power to resist acquisition; (d) the very remoteness that preserved tribal autonomy for centuries now makes their displacement politically invisible.

What “displacement” means in practice: The literature distinguishes between direct displacement (physical relocation from land), indirect displacement (loss of access to common property resources like forests, grazing land, and water sources), and economic displacement (livelihood destruction without physical relocation). Official statistics count only the first category. When a mining project acquires 500 hectares of forest land, the families living on that land are counted as displaced. But the families in surrounding villages who depended on that forest for firewood, minor forest produce, medicinal plants, grazing, and water are not counted, even though their livelihoods may be equally destroyed. The true displacement footprint of mining in Odisha is therefore substantially larger than any official count suggests.

6.2 Breakdown by Cause

Dams

Dams have been the single largest cause of displacement in Odisha, particularly in the early decades after independence.

Dam ProjectLocationYearFamilies DisplacedPersons Displaced (est.)Tribal %
HirakudSambalpur1948-1957~22,000-26,501100,000-150,000Significant (exact % debated)
RengaliAngul/Deogarh/Sambalpur1978-198411,289-13,000~46,57010.55% ST (others also marginalized)
Upper KolabKoraput1976-1998Thousands (exact data limited)SignificantHigh (tribal Koraput)
Upper IndravatiKoraput/Nabarangpur/Kalahandi1989-19925,448-5,477~20,000+42.3% (1,630 tribal families)
BalimelaMalkangiri1972SignificantNot well documentedVery high (tribal Malkangiri)
MachkundKoraput1955Early post-independenceLimited dataVery high
MandiraSundargarh1960sData limitedLimitedHigh

Aggregate from major dam projects: The seven major multipurpose projects in Odisha displaced a total of 52,584 families, of which 10,498 (approximately 20%) were Scheduled Tribe families. Major irrigation projects (Subarnarekha, Lower Indra, Lower Suktel, Rengali, etc.) displaced an additional 12,415 tribal families out of 29,053 total.

Industrial Projects

ProjectLocationPeriodDisplacement
Rourkela Steel PlantSundargarh1954-1959~32 villages displaced; significant tribal displacement
NALCO (Damanjodi)Koraput1980sTribal displacement in Koraput
HAL (Sunabeda)Koraput1960sTribal displacement
Kalinganagar Steel ComplexJajpur2000s-present~5,000 tribals for Tata Steel alone
POSCO (proposed)Jagatsinghpur2005-2017Partial acquisition before collapse (non-tribal)
UAILRayagada1996-201324+ villages affected (tribal)
Vedanta/LanjigarhKalahandi2002-presentLanjigarh refinery area (tribal)

Mines

Mining displacement is the most difficult to quantify because it occurs incrementally through expanding open-cast pits, overburden dumps, tailings ponds, and associated infrastructure. Key mining regions with documented displacement include:

  • Keonjhar iron ore belt
  • Sukinda chromite belt (Jajpur)
  • Angul-Talcher coal belt
  • Jharsuguda coal belt

The number of persons displaced by mining in Odisha is the second highest after dam projects, though exact figures are poorly documented.

The post-2000 acceleration: The pace of industrial and mining land acquisition accelerated dramatically after 2000. Between 2000 and 2010, the Naveen Patnaik government signed over 90 MoUs with steel and mining companies. The combined land requirement of these MoUs exceeded 100,000 acres, predominantly in tribal districts. Not all MoUs materialized, but those that did — Tata Steel at Kalinganagar, UAIL at Kashipur, Vedanta at Lanjigarh, and the proposed POSCO and ArcelorMittal projects — created a wave of displacement and displacement anxiety across tribal Odisha that was qualitatively different from the dam-era displacement of the 1950s-1980s. The dam projects were concentrated in time and space; the post-2000 mining and industrial projects were dispersed across multiple districts simultaneously, creating a sense among tribal communities that their land was under siege from all directions.

Wildlife Sanctuaries and Conservation

Conservation-induced displacement has also affected tribal communities:

  • Simlipal Tiger Reserve (Mayurbhanj): Tribal communities including Khadia, Mankadia, and Sahara have faced relocation from the core area. In December 2013, 32 Khadia families were relocated from Upper Barhakamuda and Bahaghar. Jamunagarh was relocated in September 2015. The community alleges these relocations were forced and violated the Forest Rights Act. The Forest Rights Act requires settlement of tribal rights before any relocation from tiger reserves, but this has been inconsistently applied.
  • Satkosia Tiger Reserve (Angul/Cuttack): Similar issues with tribal communities inside the reserve boundary.
  • Bhitarkanika National Park (Kendrapara): Fishing community displacement.

6.3 The Resettlement Deficit

The single most damning statistic about displacement in Odisha: only 35.27% of displaced persons have been resettled. This means approximately two-thirds of all people displaced by development projects since independence have received no formal rehabilitation.

Among tribal communities, the figure may be even lower, as tribal displacement often occurs from forested areas where land tenure documentation is weakest and where the displaced have the least political leverage to demand rehabilitation.

Sources:

7. Rehabilitation Failures

7.1 India’s R&R Policy Framework

India’s rehabilitation and resettlement policy has evolved through several iterations:

Policy/ActYearKey Provisions
No formal national policy1947-2003Each project had ad hoc R&R provisions (if any)
National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation2003First national framework; non-binding
National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (NRRP)2007Expanded coverage; still non-binding
RFCTLARR Act 20132013Legally binding; consent requirements; enhanced compensation

7.2 Hirakud Dam: The Original Failure

The Hirakud Dam displacement is Odisha’s foundational rehabilitation failure and establishes the template for every subsequent project:

  • Villages submerged: 325 (291 in Odisha, 34 in undivided Madhya Pradesh)
  • Land submerged: 183,000 acres, including 123,000 acres of cultivated land — some of the most fertile in western Odisha
  • Families displaced: Approximately 22,000-26,501 families (100,000-150,000 people)
  • Budgeted compensation: Rs 120 million (original estimate), later reduced to Rs 95 million
  • Compensation actually paid: Rs 33.2 million — barely 35% of the already-reduced allocation
  • Formal resettlement: The government resettled only 2,243 families in 18 rehabilitation camps — 8.46% of total displaced families
  • As of 2014: Approximately 10,000 displaced families had still not received compensation, six decades after displacement

The Hirakud Budi Anchal Sangram Samiti (organization of dam oustees) has been fighting for adequate compensation since 1995. In 2018, the National Human Rights Commission deployed its special rapporteur to investigate the rehabilitation failure. Seven decades after displacement, the fight continues. Most original oustees are dead; their descendants inherited the grievance along with the poverty.

Nehru told the villagers of Sambalpur: “If you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the country.”

7.3 Upper Indravati Dam

The Upper Indravati multipurpose project displaced 5,448-5,477 families across 97 villages in Koraput, Nabarangpur, and Kalahandi districts between 1989 and 1992. Sixty-five villages were fully submerged; 32 were partially affected. Approximately 42.3% of displaced families were tribal (around 1,630 families). The affected tribal communities included Kondh, Paraja, and Gadaba groups.

The displacement occurred in one of the most marginalized regions of Odisha — the undivided Koraput district, which was (and remains) among the poorest and most tribal-majority areas in the state. The dam provided irrigation and power to downstream districts but left the displaced upstream communities worse off than before. No systematic follow-up study of rehabilitation outcomes has been published.

7.4 Rengali Dam Displacement

  • Families displaced: 11,289-13,000 families from 236-263 villages
  • Persons displaced: Approximately 46,570 people
  • Districts affected: Angul, Deogarh, Sambalpur, Jharsuguda
  • Tribal percentage: 10.55% ST, 15.73% SC
  • Rehabilitation record: Displacement occurred between 1978 and 1984. The valuation of lost assets and compensatory measures under the R&R policy was described by displaced communities as “too low” to regain economic strength. Decades later, thousands of families remain in distress.
  • Forest Rights: Tribals displaced by the Rengali Dam have demanded community forest rights, claiming that plantation drives on their traditional forest lands have further marginalized them.

7.5 The Common Thread: Why Rehabilitation Fails

Across all major displacement events in Odisha, a common pattern emerges that explains the consistent failure of rehabilitation:

  1. Compensation based on land records, not land value. In tribal areas, much agricultural and forest land is used under customary tenure without formal revenue records. Compensation is offered only for documented land holdings, excluding vast areas of de facto tribal territory.

  2. No compensation for common property resources. A study of seven development-induced displacement projects in Odisha (1950-1994) found that no compensation was given for loss of common property resources — forests, grazing land, water sources, sacred groves — in any of the projects. For tribal communities, whose economy depends heavily on these commons, this represents a systematic undervaluation of displacement costs.

  3. Cash compensation without livelihood reconstruction. Cash disbursement to communities with limited market experience, often living in remote areas with few alternative livelihood options, typically leads to rapid depletion of compensation money without establishment of sustainable alternative livelihoods. The money is spent; the poverty returns.

  4. Temporal disconnect. The gap between displacement and rehabilitation can span decades. Hirakud Dam families displaced in the 1950s were still fighting for compensation in the 2020s. By the time compensation arrives (if it does), the original displaced generation may have died, and their descendants have adapted to poverty.

  5. Institutional capacity deficit. District-level administration responsible for implementing R&R packages is the same machinery that facilitates land acquisition for the project. There is no independent rehabilitation agency with dedicated funding, technical capacity, or political motivation to ensure complete rehabilitation.

  6. No enforcement mechanism. No consequence exists for failure to rehabilitate. Companies and governments face legal challenges for inadequate compensation, but these cases take decades to resolve, and the penalty for failure to rehabilitate is typically an order to pay more compensation — not cancellation of the project, not criminal liability, not reversal of the acquisition.

7.6 The RFCTLARR Act 2013

The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR Act) represented a significant legislative improvement:

Key provisions:

  • Compensation at 2-4 times market value for rural land (4 times for acquisitions by private companies)
  • Social Impact Assessment (SIA) mandatory before acquisition
  • Consent of 70% of affected families required for PPP projects; 80% for private projects
  • Comprehensive R&R package including land-for-land option
  • Special provisions for Scheduled Tribes (Sections 41-42):
    • ST families to be resettled preferably in the same Scheduled Area
    • At least one-third of compensation to be paid as first installment
    • Affected STs must be resettled in a compact block to retain ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identity

Odisha implementation:

  • Odisha notified the ORTFCTLARR Rules in 2016 (three years after the central Act)
  • The gap between policy and practice remains significant
  • The JSW project in Jagatsinghpur (on former POSCO land) has been flagged by UN Special Rapporteurs for potential violations of the RFCTLARR Act’s provisions
  • The Sijimali bauxite project has been challenged for allegedly obtaining fraudulent gram sabha consent

The structural problem: The RFCTLARR Act significantly improved the legal framework on paper. But enforcement depends on the same state machinery that facilitates land acquisition for industrial projects. The state government simultaneously plays the roles of land acquirer, project facilitator, regulator, and (in theory) protector of affected communities’ rights. This structural conflict of interest ensures that the gap between law and implementation persists.

Sources:

8. The State as Extraction Agent

8.1 How the State Facilitates Mining in Tribal Areas

The Government of Odisha plays a dual role: constitutional protector of tribal rights under the Fifth Schedule and PESA, and active facilitator of mineral extraction from tribal lands. The mechanisms:

Land acquisition: The state acquires land from tribal communities using eminent domain powers, then transfers it to mining companies. Before the RFCTLARR Act 2013, compensation was set at below-market rates. Even after 2013, the consent provisions are contested (as the Sijimali case demonstrates).

Environmental clearance facilitation: The state government actively lobbies central ministries for environmental and forest clearances for mining projects. In the POSCO case, clearances were granted despite the Meena Gupta Committee’s recommendation to reject them. In the Sijimali case, gram sabha consent was allegedly forged.

Police force deployment: When tribal communities resist land acquisition, the state deploys police force — up to and including lethal force (Kalinganagar 2006, Maikanch 2000). The Kalinganagar inquiry commission justified the police firing. At Sijimali, activists have been charged under the UAPA.

PESA non-implementation: The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) mandates that gram sabhas in Scheduled Areas be consulted before mining lease grants and that they have the power to prevent alienation of tribal land and manage natural resources. The CAG has documented 136 violations of PESA provisions in Odisha. Key provisions that remain unimplemented after 29 years:

  • Gram sabha consent required before grant of prospecting license or mining lease for minor minerals — systematically bypassed
  • Gram sabha power to prevent alienation of land — overridden by industrial land acquisition
  • Gram sabha ownership of minor forest produce — inadequately operationalized
  • Gram sabha authority over plans, programmes, and projects for social and economic development — subsumed by state-level planning
  • Gram sabha authority over management of water bodies — ignored in dam and industrial water allocation decisions

The non-implementation of PESA is not accidental negligence; it is structural necessity. Full implementation of PESA would give tribal gram sabhas effective veto power over mining projects in Scheduled Areas. Since mining in Scheduled Areas generates a substantial portion of the state’s revenue, the state has a rational incentive to keep PESA unimplemented. The result is that the act designed to protect tribal self-governance exists as a legal text without operational reality. The Niyamgiri gram sabha votes of 2013 remain exceptional precisely because the Supreme Court compelled the process; without judicial intervention, no comparable gram sabha consultation has been voluntarily conducted by the state before approving mining projects.

8.2 Odisha Mining Corporation (OMC)

OMC is wholly owned by the Government of Odisha and is the largest state Public Sector Undertaking in the mining sector in the country:

  • Operations: Exploration, mining, and trading of iron ore, chrome ore, and bauxite
  • Revenue (FY 2023-24): Total revenue of Rs 24,565.1 crore; EBITDA of Rs 10,495.4 crore; net profit of Rs 9,076.2 crore
  • Dividends to state: OMC pays substantial dividends to the Odisha government — from Rs 60 crore in 2004-05 to Rs 250 crore in 2008-09, with the figure likely much higher in recent high-revenue years
  • Role in conflicts: OMC was the petitioner in the Niyamgiri Supreme Court case (Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment and Forest). OMC also challenged the gram sabha resolutions in 2016. OMC functions as the state’s mining arm — it operates mines in tribal areas, generates revenue for the state treasury, and has been the institutional instrument through which the state pursues mining on tribal land.

8.3 Industrial Policy and the Extraction Incentive

Odisha’s industrial policy framework incentivizes mineral extraction over value-addition in several ways:

IPR 2022 (Industrial Policy Resolution):

  • 30% capital investment subsidy on plant and machinery
  • SGST reimbursement for 7 years
  • Energy subsidy for 7 years
  • Land allotment from state land bank with no stamp duty
  • Exemption from land conversion fees for industrial use
  • Full reimbursement of employer contributions to ESI and EPF for 5 years

“Make in Odisha” / “Utkarsh Odisha” investor summits:

  • The Utkarsh Odisha-Make in Odisha Conclave 2025 secured Rs 16.73 trillion (Rs 16,73,000 crore) in investment intentions across 595 proposals
  • 145 investment-related MoUs were signed
  • MoUs for 45 steel plants with an approved production capacity of 134 MTPA
  • ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India signed MoU for a 24 MTPA greenfield mega steel plant in Kendrapara at Rs 1.02 trillion

The structural incentive: These investments are overwhelmingly in extractive and primary processing industries (steel, aluminium, chrome processing) that require land and mineral resources from tribal areas. The state’s revenue model depends on attracting these investments. Every investor summit is, in effect, an exercise in offering tribal lands and mineral resources to corporations.

The extraction-welfare equilibrium documented in SeeUtkal’s Long Arc series operates here: mining generates revenue; revenue funds welfare schemes (KALIA, BSKY, Mission Shakti); welfare schemes generate votes; votes sustain the government that approves more mining. The tribal communities whose lands are mined receive a fraction of the welfare benefits and bear almost all the displacement costs.

8.4 Revenue Dependence

The structural dependence of Odisha’s state finances on mining creates a rational incentive to continue extraction:

  • Mining-related non-tax revenue constitutes approximately 6-8% of GSDP — compared to a national average of approximately 1.3% for state governments
  • The 171% surge in non-tax revenue in 2021-22 that created a fiscal surplus was driven primarily by mining
  • Mining revenue for 2022-23 was estimated at Rs 43,444 crore
  • High mining revenue has enabled the state to reduce borrowing dependence

The comparison that illuminates the gap: Norway captures approximately 78% of petroleum value for the state; Botswana captures approximately 80% of diamond value. Odisha captures approximately 8-12% of mineral value through royalties, DMF levies, and auction premiums. But even this 8-12% is now so large in absolute terms (tens of thousands of crores annually) that the state has become structurally dependent on it.

Sources:

9. District Mineral Foundation (DMF)

9.1 What DMF Was Supposed to Do

The District Mineral Foundation was established under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (MMDR Amendment). Mining leaseholders are required to contribute to the DMF of the district in which the mine is located:

  • Leases granted before January 12, 2015: Contribution at 30% of royalty paid
  • Leases granted after January 12, 2015: Contribution at 10% of royalty paid

The Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY) was launched in September 2015 to provide the spending framework for DMF funds. The stated objective: benefit persons and areas affected by mining-related operations.

High priority areas (60% of funds): Drinking water and sanitation, healthcare, education, welfare of women and children, skill development, environmental preservation and pollution control, housing, livelihood, road connectivity.

Other priority areas (40% of funds): Physical infrastructure, irrigation, energy, watershed development, afforestation.

9.2 DMF Collection in Odisha

Odisha leads India in DMF collection by a wide margin:

MetricFigure
Cumulative DMF collection (as of mid-2025)Over Rs 31,324 crore
Utilization rateApproximately 49-55% of collected funds
Sanctioned project value (2015-16 to 2023-24)Rs 17,926.79 crore (Sundargarh and Keonjhar alone)

District-wise collection (available data, noting figures may be from different time periods):

DistrictDMF CollectionNotes
KeonjharHighest in state (Rs 983 crore to Rs 1,524 crore in earlier periods; substantially higher now)Iron ore, manganese, chromite
SundargarhSecond highest (Rs 621-780 crore in earlier periods)Iron ore, manganese
JajpurSignificant (Rs 200 crore in earlier period)Chromite
AngulSignificant (Rs 151-836 crore in earlier periods)Coal
JharsugudaAmong top 7Coal
KoraputAmong top 7Bauxite
RayagadaAmong top 7Bauxite

Seven districts (Keonjhar, Sundargarh, Jajpur, Angul, Jharsuguda, Koraput, and Rayagada) account for approximately 90% of the state’s DMF collection.

9.3 What DMF Is Actually Spent On

The allocation pattern reveals a systematic mismatch between what mining-affected communities need and what DMF funds are used for:

  • Roads and bridges: Over 33% of sanctioned funds — the single largest category
  • Drinking water supply: Approximately 25%
  • Healthcare and education: Present but predominantly construction-driven (building infrastructure without providing the human resources to staff it)
  • Direct livelihood support, skill development, housing: Smaller allocations

The CSE (Centre for Science and Environment) analysis found:

  • Not a single district has made required investments for improving child nutrition or under-five mortality rates
  • This failure is “particularly worse in areas with high tribal population”
  • Healthcare and education spending focuses on building physical structures rather than hiring doctors, teachers, and specialists
  • Investments do not reflect the priorities of mining-affected people

9.4 Governance of DMF: Who Decides Spending?

Structural governance issues:

  • DMF is governed by a Trust headed by the District Collector, with members including MLAs, MPs, and some nominated representatives
  • None of the DMFs in Odisha have identified mining-affected people as specific beneficiaries, despite PMKKKY requirements
  • Mining-affected communities have been “left out from the decision-making process”
  • No performance evaluation or social audit has been conducted for most DMFs

Tribal representation: The governance structure does not ensure proportional representation of tribal communities in DMF spending decisions, even though tribal communities bear the greatest impact of mining operations and the funds are legally intended to benefit them.

9.5 CAG Audit Findings

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) conducted a detailed audit of DMF operations in Odisha covering 2014-15 to 2023-24, revealing large-scale irregularities:

Violation of statutory approval processes:

  • In Keonjhar district alone, 1,730 projects worth Rs 2,984.28 crore were implemented in Scheduled Areas without gram sabha approval, which is legally mandated under PESA.

Diversion of funds to non-mining areas:

  • In Keonjhar and Sundargarh, Rs 983.32 crore went to 976 villages that had no connection to mining operations.
  • Meanwhile, 488 directly mining-affected villages and 96 indirectly affected villages received no project benefits at all.

Inappropriate expenditures:

  • DMF trusts released Rs 168.15 crore for purchasing furniture for schools — expenditure that contravened PMKKKY guidelines and Odisha DMF Rules.
  • Sundargarh and Keonjhar engaged 98 dentists and 83 specialists at remuneration significantly above government-prescribed rates, resulting in excess payment of Rs 43.79 crore.

The structural problem with DMF: The DMF was designed as a redistributive mechanism — a way to return some mining revenue to affected communities. But the governance structure ensures that the same state apparatus that facilitates mining also controls how DMF money is spent. Mining-affected tribal communities have no meaningful voice in allocation decisions. The result is predictable: funds are diverted to politically connected areas, spent on visible infrastructure rather than human development, and used for purposes that benefit state administration rather than displaced communities.

The CAG findings quantify what the structure predicts: Rs 983.32 crore diverted to 976 non-mining villages while 584 mining-affected villages received nothing. In a state where mining generates over Rs 31,000 crore in DMF funds alone, the mechanism designed to correct the injustice has itself become an instrument of misallocation.

NHRC intervention: The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has also flagged the underutilization of DMF funds in mining areas of Odisha, seeking action-taken reports from the Chief Secretary on the failure to deploy DMF resources for the welfare of mining-affected communities.

New government direction (2024): After the change of government in 2024, Chief Minister Mohan Charan Majhi directed officers to expedite DMF spending and ordered all departments to submit DMF audit reports and annual accounts. Whether this directive translates into meaningful reallocation toward mining-affected tribal communities remains to be seen.

The deeper structural issue: DMF represents an attempt to solve a distributive justice problem through a technocratic mechanism. The assumption is that if mining generates revenue and a portion of that revenue is redirected to affected communities, the injustice of extraction is mitigated. But this assumption is flawed on multiple levels:

  1. The DMF contribution rate (10-30% of royalty) captures only a fraction of the value extracted. If the state captures 8-12% of mineral value through royalties, and DMF takes 10-30% of that royalty, then DMF represents approximately 0.8-3.6% of total mineral value. The communities bearing 100% of the displacement costs receive under 4% of the value.

  2. Cash transfers cannot compensate for loss of place, culture, and ecological relationships. When a tribal community is displaced from ancestral land, the loss includes not just economic assets but sacred groves, burial grounds, community bonds, ecological knowledge, and spiritual connection to landscape. No monetary amount addresses these losses.

  3. The governance structure of DMF is inherently captured. District Collectors who chair DMF trusts are the same officials who facilitate land acquisition and mining approvals. The institutional incentive is to maintain mining, not to challenge it by empowering affected communities.

Sources:

10. Cross-Cutting Themes and Structural Observations

10.1 The Pattern Across All Cases

Every major displacement conflict in Odisha follows a recognizable sequence:

  1. Mineral or resource is identified under tribal/community land
  2. MoU signed between state government and corporation, often at investor summits
  3. Land acquisition initiated — typically with inadequate compensation and without proper consent
  4. Community resistance forms — often spontaneously, sometimes with external civil society support
  5. State deploys force — ranging from police intimidation to lethal firing (Maikanch, Kalinganagar)
  6. Legal battles ensue — environmental clearances challenged, Forest Rights Act invoked
  7. Outcome bifurcates:
    • Project proceeds (Kalinganagar/Tata Steel, UAIL/Kashipur): community is displaced, resistance is crushed or exhausted, rehabilitation is incomplete
    • Project is blocked or collapses (Niyamgiri, POSCO): but the blocking may be temporary (Niyamgiri → Sijimali; POSCO → JSW)

10.2 What Determines Whether Resistance Succeeds?

Comparing the cases suggests several factors:

FactorNiyamgiri (Success)Kalinganagar (Failure)POSCO (Partial — project collapsed but land not returned)UAIL (Failure — delayed but built)
Legal frameworkSupreme Court intervention; FRA appliedNo equivalent legal interventionNGT suspended clearance but overriddenNo decisive legal victory
International attentionSurvival International campaign; Church of England divestmentAmnesty report but limited sustained international pressureSome international attention but less sustainedLimited international attention
Community cohesionDongria Kondh: unified PVTG with strong cultural identityMultiple tribal groups; less unifiedNon-tribal; mixed economic interestsTribal but facing sustained state pressure
Sacred geographyNiyam Raja/Niyam Dongar provided powerful spiritual anchorNo equivalent sacred geography argumentBetel vine economy, not sacred geographyLess prominent sacred geography narrative
Scale of oppositionRelatively small area (660 ha) but symbolically powerfulLarge industrial complex, multiple companiesMassive project, massive oppositionSmaller scale, sustained but eventually overwhelmed
Political momentJairam Ramesh as Environment Minister; UPA II government more receptive to environmental concernsBJP-BJD alliance period; state prioritized industrializationMultiple political phases; resistance outlasted political cyclesState consistently supported project

10.3 The Resistance Ecosystem

Tribal resistance to mining and displacement in Odisha has evolved a multi-layered ecosystem:

Community-level organizations: The primary resistance unit is the village or cluster of villages directly affected. These form ad hoc committees — PPSS for POSCO, the Niyamgiri Suraksha Samiti for Vedanta, the Kucheipadar movement for UAIL, the Maa Maati Maali Surakhya Manch for Sijimali. These organizations are typically led by local leaders with deep community trust and are characterized by horizontal, consensus-based decision-making.

Civil society and NGO networks: Organizations like the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), Campaign for Survival and Dignity (CSD), and various state-level organizations provide legal aid, media amplification, and strategic coordination. International organizations like Survival International (in the Niyamgiri case), Amnesty International, and Mining Watch Canada have provided global visibility.

Legal activists and public interest litigation: Environmental and tribal rights lawyers have been central to the resistance ecosystem. The use of the Forest Rights Act, PESA, and environmental law as defensive instruments has been critical. The Niyamgiri Supreme Court judgment was the product of sustained legal advocacy.

Academic researchers: Scholars like Walter Fernandes, Felix Padel, Samarendra Das, and others have provided the empirical foundation for resistance claims, documenting displacement numbers, environmental damage, and rehabilitation failures.

Media: Independent media outlets (Down to Earth, Mongabay India, The Wire, Scroll.in) have played a crucial role in documenting and amplifying tribal resistance narratives that would otherwise be invisible in mainstream media.

The state’s counter-ecosystem: The state has developed its own set of tools to counter resistance: (a) deployment of paramilitary forces; (b) criminal charges against community leaders, including sedition and UAPA; (c) co-optation of some community members through employment promises and individual compensation; (d) manufacture of consent through allegedly forged gram sabha resolutions (as alleged in the Sijimali case); (e) framing resistance as “anti-development” or “Maoist-influenced.”

10.4 The Environmental Health Burden

Beyond displacement, mining imposes a severe environmental health burden on surrounding communities, disproportionately affecting tribal populations:

Sukinda Valley (Jajpur): The chromite mining belt of Sukinda was ranked as the fourth most polluted place in the world by the Blacksmith Institute (now Pure Earth) in 2007, due to hexavalent chromium contamination. Over 70% of surface water and 60% of drinking water in the mining areas had hexavalent chromium concentrations exceeding WHO standards. Chromium-6 is a known carcinogen. The health effects on surrounding communities — predominantly tribal and Dalit — include elevated rates of gastrointestinal diseases, skin lesions, and cancer, though comprehensive epidemiological studies specific to Sukinda remain limited.

Iron ore mining belt (Keonjhar/Sundargarh): Open-cast iron ore mining generates massive dust emissions and overburden dumps that contaminate water sources. Villages near mines report respiratory problems, water contamination, and loss of agricultural productivity due to dust deposition. The Joda-Koira mining belt in Keonjhar has seen progressive degradation of forest cover, stream flows, and air quality.

Coal mining (Angul/Jharsuguda): The Talcher-Angul coal belt, combined with associated thermal power plants, creates a concentrated pollution zone. Fly ash disposal, water contamination from coal washing, and air pollution from coal combustion affect surrounding communities.

The unmeasured cost: The health costs of mining pollution are borne almost entirely by local communities and are not reflected in mining revenue calculations, DMF allocations, or corporate balance sheets. There is no requirement for mining companies to conduct longitudinal health monitoring of surrounding populations. The environmental clearance process assesses projected impacts at the time of approval but does not systematically track actual health outcomes after mining begins. This represents a significant unquantified subsidy from tribal communities to the mining industry.

10.5 Data Gaps and Research Limitations

Several important areas lack reliable data:

  • Total mining displacement: No comprehensive registry of persons displaced by mining in Odisha exists. Dam displacement is better documented because dam construction requires specific approvals and creates clearly defined submergence zones. Mining displacement is incremental and poorly tracked.
  • Post-displacement outcomes: There is very little systematic data on what happens to displaced communities 10, 20, or 50 years after displacement. The Hirakud case (seven decades of unresolved grievances) is documented because of sustained activism, not because of systematic tracking.
  • DMF spending impact: Despite over Rs 31,000 crore collected, there has been no comprehensive assessment of whether DMF spending has actually improved the lives of mining-affected communities. The CAG audit found irregularities; what is missing is an impact evaluation.
  • Cumulative environmental impact: The health effects of mining pollution on tribal communities (hexavalent chromium in Sukinda, particulate matter from iron ore processing, dust from open-cast mines) are poorly documented and likely underestimate the true burden.

10.6 The Constitutional Contradiction

The Indian Constitution contains a fundamental contradiction regarding tribal areas and mineral resources:

  • Fifth Schedule: Empowers the Governor to make regulations for the “peace and good government” of Scheduled Areas, including prohibiting or restricting the transfer of land by or among members of Scheduled Tribes. PESA (1996) further empowers gram sabhas in Scheduled Areas.
  • Article 39(b): Directs the state to ensure that “the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good.”
  • MMDR Act: Vests mineral ownership in the state, regardless of surface land ownership.

The result: tribal communities own the surface of the land (protected by the Fifth Schedule and PESA), but the state owns the minerals beneath it (under the MMDR Act). The Fifth Schedule protects tribal land from alienation; the MMDR Act enables the state to extract minerals from beneath that very land. These two legal frameworks operate in permanent tension, and in practice, the MMDR Act consistently prevails because it generates revenue while the Fifth Schedule generates only constitutional obligations.

The Niyamgiri judgment of 2013 offered a partial resolution: the Supreme Court held that gram sabha consultation under the Forest Rights Act must precede mining approval, effectively creating a community consent requirement. But this resolution was case-specific and has not been systematically applied to other mining projects. The Sijimali case, where consent was allegedly manufactured rather than genuinely obtained, illustrates how even judicial precedent can be undermined at the implementation level.

The constitutional contradiction is not merely a legal technicality. It represents a fundamental unresolved question about the relationship between the Indian state and its tribal communities: does the state exist to protect the rights of its most vulnerable citizens, or do those citizens exist as collateral in the state’s pursuit of revenue and industrial growth? Odisha’s mining history suggests the latter, though the Niyamgiri case demonstrates that this outcome is not inevitable.

10.7 The 2024 Political Transition

The change of government in Odisha in 2024 — from the BJD under Naveen Patnaik to the BJP under Mohan Charan Majhi — has not yet produced a visible change in the state’s approach to mining and tribal rights. Chief Minister Majhi, himself from the Santhal tribe, represents a symbolically significant shift (the first tribal chief minister of Odisha). However, the structural incentives that drove the extraction-welfare equilibrium under the BJD remain unchanged:

  • Mining revenue continues to be the primary source of non-tax revenue
  • Investor summits continue to attract mining and steel MoUs
  • The Sijimali bauxite project has continued under the new government
  • DMF governance has not been structurally reformed, though Majhi has directed expedited spending
  • The JSW project at Jagatsinghpur continues despite ongoing resistance

The transition will test whether a tribal chief minister governing under the BJP — a party with a strong pro-industry orientation at the national level — can or will alter the structural relationship between the state and its tribal communities. Early indicators suggest continuity rather than change. Whether this is because the structural incentives are genuinely immovable, or because the new government has not yet had time to develop alternative approaches, remains an open question as of early 2026.

Confidence note (Principle 7): The assessment that the political transition has not produced meaningful change in mining-tribal dynamics is based on observable policy continuity as of April 2026. It is possible that structural reforms are being developed that have not yet become visible. This assessment should be revisited as more data becomes available. Confidence: approximately 70%.

Appendix: Key Data Tables

A. Odisha’s Mineral Reserves Summary

MineralNational Share (%)Odisha ReserveKey Districts
Chromite95-98%~111 MTJajpur, Dhenkanal, Keonjhar
Nickel~92%Limited dataJajpur, Keonjhar
Bauxite49-59%~1,530 MTKoraput, Rayagada, Kalahandi, Sundargarh
Iron Ore28-33%SubstantialKeonjhar, Sundargarh, Mayurbhanj, Jajpur
Coal~24%~51,571 MTAngul, Jharsuguda
ManganeseTop 1-2 nationally~116 MTSundargarh, Keonjhar, Rayagada

B. Major Displacement Events in Odisha (Post-Independence)

ProjectTypeYearFamilies DisplacedDeaths in ResistanceTribal?
Hirakud DamDam1948-195722,000-26,501None documentedMixed (significant tribal)
Rourkela Steel PlantIndustrial1954-1959~32 villagesNone documentedYes (Sundargarh tribal belt)
Rengali DamDam1978-198411,289-13,000None documented10.55% ST
Upper Indravati DamDam1989-19925,448-5,477None documented42.3% ST
UAIL/Kashipur (Maikanch)Mining/Industrial200024+ villages3 killed (Dec 2000)Yes (Kondh, Paraja)
KalinganagarIndustrial2006~5,000 persons13-14 killed (Jan 2006)Yes (Ho, Munda, Bhuyan)
POSCO/JagatsinghpurIndustrial2005-2017Partial (project collapsed)4+ killed in related violenceNo (not tribal area)
Vedanta/NiyamgiriMining2004-2013Avoided (project rejected)NoneYes (Dongria Kondh PVTG)

C. DMF Collection and Issues (Odisha)

MetricValue
Cumulative collection (mid-2025)Rs 31,324+ crore
National rank1st
Utilization rate49-55%
Funds diverted to non-mining villages (Keonjhar + Sundargarh)Rs 983.32 crore
Mining-affected villages receiving zero benefits (Keonjhar + Sundargarh)584 villages
Projects without gram sabha approval (Keonjhar)1,730 projects worth Rs 2,984.28 crore

D. Odisha Scheduled Areas and Mineral Overlap

DistrictScheduled Area StatusST Population %Major Minerals
MayurbhanjFully ScheduledHigh (~56%)Iron ore
SundargarhFully ScheduledHigh (~50%)Iron ore, manganese, coal
KoraputFully ScheduledHigh (~50%)Bauxite
RayagadaFully ScheduledHigh (~55%)Bauxite, manganese
MalkangiriFully ScheduledHigh (~57%)Limited mining
NabarangpurFully ScheduledHigh (~55%)Limited mining
KeonjharPartially ScheduledModerate (~44%)Iron ore, manganese, chromite
JajpurNot ScheduledModerate (~8% but high in Sukinda)Chromite (95% of India)
KalahandiPartially ScheduledModerate (~28%)Bauxite
KandhamalPartially ScheduledHigh (~51%)Limited mining
AngulNot ScheduledLow (~12%)Coal
JharsugudaNot ScheduledLow (~22%)Coal

Note: ST population percentages are approximate, based on Census 2011 data. District-level percentages for post-2011 district reorganizations may differ. The overlap is starkest in the bauxite belt (Koraput, Rayagada, Kalahandi — all Scheduled Areas, all with major bauxite deposits) and the iron ore belt (Keonjhar, Sundargarh, Mayurbhanj — all fully or partially Scheduled, all with major iron ore deposits).

Source Summary

Government Sources

Academic/Research Sources

  • Walter Fernandes, “Development induced displacement and sustainable development,” Social Change 31(1&2), 2001
  • “Mining-induced displacement and tribal resistance: The case of Odisha, India,” ScienceDirect, 2025
  • “Examining Displacement, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Processes: Rengali Dam,” SAGE Journals, 2020
  • “Dam and Tribal Displacement: A Case Study of Odisha,” e-Tribal Tribune
  • “Tribal Movements against Mining-induced Displacement in Odisha: The Case of Dongria Kondh’s Niyamgiri Movement,” SAGE Journals, 2022

Journalism/Investigation

  • Down to Earth (multiple articles on DMF, Kalinganagar, Niyamgiri, Sijimali)
  • Scroll.in (POSCO aftermath)
  • Mongabay India (JSW, Simlipal relocation)
  • Land Conflict Watch (Kalinganagar, Niyamgiri, Jagatsinghpur)
  • The Wire (Dongria Kondh post-2013)
  • NewsClick (Kalinganagar inquiry, Dhinkia)

Civil Society

News

  • Business Standard (multiple articles on OMC, DMF, POSCO, Kalinganagar)
  • The Diplomat (Dhinkia resistance, 2022)
  • Countercurrents (UN experts and JSW, 2026)
  • The Probe (Vedanta/Sijimali forest clearance, 2025)

Cited in

The narrative series that build on this research.