English only · Odia translation in progress

Chapter 7: What’s Actually Possible — Three Tiers of Transformation

This is the opinion chapter. The previous six chapters were facts, economics, and process. This one is prescription — which means everything here should be read with the appropriate discount rate. Predictions about economic development are notoriously unreliable. Plans announced with fanfare have a dismal track record in Odisha, as the POSCO saga and the MoU graveyard attest. The history of states that successfully transformed their resource curse into a resource blessing is short; the history of states that announced they would do so and didn’t is very long.

That disclaimer stated, here is an honest assessment of what Odisha could actually build, at what cost, in what timeframe, and what could go wrong.

The Three Tiers

Economic development does not happen in a single leap. It happens in stages, each building on the previous one. The mistake that Odisha’s “announcement economy” has repeatedly made is to aim for Tier 3 (auto component clusters, defense-grade alloys) without building Tier 1 (pelletization, ferro-alloys, basic processing). You cannot build a second floor without a first floor, no matter how impressive the architect’s rendering.

The three tiers below are organized by time horizon, capital requirement, institutional complexity, and — critically — plausibility. Each tier is harder than the previous one. Each depends on the previous one succeeding.

Tier 1: The Foundation (5 Years, 2026-2031)

What it is: Expanding basic value addition — the processing steps that are already proven, already economically viable, and already partially present in Odisha. This is not visionary. This is doing more of what works.

1A: Pelletization Expansion

Current state: Odisha has approximately 30+ MTPA of pellet capacity (JSPL, ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel, and smaller plants). The state produces ~140 MTPA of iron ore. Most fines leave as raw fines — the lowest-value form.

Target: Add 40-50 MTPA of pellet capacity over 5 years.

Investment required: Rs 15,000-25,000 crore (at Rs 400-500 crore per MTPA of pellet capacity).

Employment: 15,000-25,000 direct jobs + 40,000-60,000 indirect.

Why it’s achievable: Pelletization technology is mature, well-understood, and the economics work at current iron ore prices. Multiple companies have the capability. The limiting factors are environmental clearances, water availability, and power supply — real constraints but not insurmountable.

Why it matters: Pellets are worth 2-2.5x more than fines. Converting 50 MTPA of fines into pellets adds roughly Rs 15,000-25,000 crore in annual value within the state. It also creates a local supply of high-quality furnace feed, making the state more attractive for steel plant investment.

Confidence level: 75%. This is the most likely tier to actually happen because it requires the least institutional change. The market economics work. The technology is available. The main risk is bureaucratic delay in clearances.

1B: Ferrochrome and Ferromanganese Expansion

Current state: Odisha has meaningful ferrochrome capacity (IMFA, Balasore Alloys, Tata Steel’s Indian Chrome, Jindal Stainless Jajpur). But significant chromite ore still leaves the state unprocessed.

Target: Ensure 90%+ of Odisha’s chromite is converted to ferrochrome within the state. Add ferromanganese capacity to process the state’s manganese ore domestically.

Investment required: Rs 5,000-8,000 crore for additional ferro-alloy capacity.

Employment: 8,000-12,000 direct + 20,000-30,000 indirect.

Why it’s achievable: Ferro-alloy production is a mid-scale industry (not mega-project scale), the technology is proven, and the raw material is literally in the same district. Submerged arc furnace smelting is well-established in India.

Key constraint: Electricity. Ferro-alloy smelting is energy-intensive — approximately 3,500-4,000 kWh per tonne of ferrochrome. At Rs 5-6/kWh, electricity is the largest single cost. Competitive power tariffs for ferro-alloy units are essential, and the state government has instruments (industrial power subsidies, captive power policies) to address this.

Confidence level: 70%. Achievable if power tariffs are competitive.

1C: Alumina Refining Expansion

Current state: NALCO’s Damanjodi refinery (2.1 MTPA) is the primary alumina facility. Vedanta’s Lanjigarh refinery in Kalahandi has expanded to 3-4 MTPA.

Target: Expand alumina refining capacity to consume a larger share of Odisha’s bauxite within the state. Current capacity vs. potential is well within reach.

Investment required: Rs 5,000-10,000 crore for refinery expansion.

Why it matters: Alumina is worth 25-35x more than bauxite. Every tonne of bauxite refined into alumina within Odisha retains Rs 25,000-35,000 of value in the state.

Key constraint: Environmental management (red mud disposal), water supply, and — for Niyamgiri and Kodingamali — the absolute constraint of tribal consent. No alumina expansion should proceed by overriding the Niyamgiri precedent. There are bauxite deposits beyond the contested hills, and any expansion must respect the gram sabha framework established by the Supreme Court in 2013.

Confidence level: 60%. Technically straightforward but politically and environmentally sensitive.

Tier 1 Total

Component	Investment (Rs crore)	Direct jobs	Confidence
Pelletization	15,000-25,000	15,000-25,000	75%
Ferro-alloys	5,000-8,000	8,000-12,000	70%
Alumina refining	5,000-10,000	5,000-8,000	60%
Tier 1 Total	25,000-43,000	28,000-45,000

At current exchange rates, this is $3-5 billion. Not trivial, but well within the range of industrial investment that Odisha has historically attracted. The 2024 Make in Odisha conclave generated Rs 4+ lakh crore in “investment intentions” — even if 5% of that materializes, it exceeds Tier 1’s requirements.

Tier 2: The Industrial Leap (10 Years, 2026-2036)

What it is: Building integrated processing capacity — steel plants, green hydrogen facilities, critical mineral processing — that transforms Odisha from a raw material supplier to an industrial producer. This is where the economics change fundamentally but where the institutional requirements also become much more demanding.

2A: Green Steel in the Kalinganagar-Angul Corridor

Current state: Tata Steel Kalinganagar (expanding to 8 MTPA, scope for 16 MTPA). JSPL Angul (6 MTPA, expanding). Rourkela Steel Plant (2 MTPA). Total in-state crude steel: ~22 MTPA.

Target: 45-55 MTPA of crude steel capacity by 2036, with at least 30% produced through green hydrogen DRI by 2035.

Investment required: Rs 1,00,000-1,50,000 crore for an additional 25-30 MTPA of capacity, including green hydrogen DRI plants and associated renewable energy.

Employment: 75,000-100,000 direct + 200,000-300,000 indirect.

What it requires:

Renewable energy: 15-20 GW of solar and wind to power electrolyzers for green hydrogen production. This is ambitious but within Odisha’s 170 GW solar + 12 GW wind potential.
Green hydrogen electrolyzers: 5-10 GW capacity, producing 1-2 million tonnes of hydrogen per year.
Water: electrolysis consumes approximately 9 litres of water per kg of hydrogen. 1 million tonnes of hydrogen requires 9 billion litres of water per year — a significant but manageable demand given Odisha’s river systems (Mahanadi, Brahmani, Baitarani).
Land: 10,000-20,000 acres for plant sites, solar installations, and supporting infrastructure.
Workforce: 50,000-80,000 skilled industrial workers who do not currently exist in the state. Building this workforce requires the ITI expansion, NIT Rourkela capacity increase, and industry-linked training described in Chapter 5.
Rail and port connectivity: expanded rail capacity from the mining belt to Kalinganagar/Angul processing zones, and upgraded port capacity at Paradip and Dhamra for steel exports.

Why green steel, not just more blast furnaces: EU CBAM will make blast-furnace steel progressively less competitive for export markets. By 2035, any new blast furnace capacity risks becoming a stranded asset — a 40-year investment locked into a technology that faces rising carbon costs. Green hydrogen DRI is future-proof, aligns with India’s National Green Hydrogen Mission, and leverages Odisha’s unique combination of iron ore + solar potential.

Confidence level: 50%. This is genuinely uncertain. It requires sustained political will across multiple government terms, massive infrastructure investment, successful renewable energy buildout, green hydrogen cost reduction to $2/kg or below, and resolution of land acquisition challenges. Any one of these could fail. But it is not impossible — similar-scale industrial transformations have occurred in India (Gujarat’s petrochemical corridor, Tamil Nadu’s auto corridor) over comparable timeframes.

2B: Critical Mineral Processing

Target: Build processing facilities for graphite, nickel, manganese sulphate (battery-grade), and potentially rare earths within Odisha, linked to the Critical Minerals Processing Park designation.

Investment required: Rs 10,000-20,000 crore for processing infrastructure.

Employment: 15,000-25,000 direct + 40,000-60,000 indirect.

What it requires:

Successful exploration confirming commercial-grade deposits of graphite, nickel, and associated minerals
Environmental clearances that balance extraction with tribal rights
Technology partnerships — China currently dominates processing technology, and India will need to acquire or develop capabilities through partnerships with Australia, Japan, South Korea, or domestic R&D
Customer commitment — processing capacity needs off-take agreements with battery manufacturers

Why it could work: India’s strategic imperative to reduce China dependency is genuine and funded ($4 billion National Critical Minerals Mission). Odisha is specifically designated as a processing park location. The mineral deposits exist. The question is execution speed.

Confidence level: 40%. Lower than green steel because the entire domestic critical minerals ecosystem is in its infancy. The PLI battery scheme’s 2.8% achievement rate is a sobering precedent. Technology gaps are real — India doesn’t currently have commercial-scale graphite spheronization or rare earth separation capabilities. This tier requires things that India has not previously demonstrated it can do quickly: technology development, rapid infrastructure buildout, and sustained institutional focus.

2C: Stainless Steel Manufacturing

Target: Build integrated stainless steel capacity in Jajpur district (near the Sukinda chromite belt), going beyond ferrochrome to produce finished stainless steel flat and long products.

Investment required: Rs 15,000-25,000 crore for a 1-2 MTPA stainless steel complex.

Employment: 15,000-20,000 direct + 40,000-60,000 indirect.

Why in Odisha: 98% of India’s chromite is in Odisha. Jindal Stainless already has a facility in Jajpur. The logic of processing near the raw material — which has not applied historically because Jindal built its main plant at Hisar decades ago — becomes more compelling with rising transport costs and the availability of renewable energy.

Confidence level: 45%. Depends on whether Jindal Stainless or another player decides to build a full integrated facility in Odisha rather than continuing to ship ferrochrome to Haryana. The economics increasingly favor Odisha-based production, but corporate inertia and the established Hisar ecosystem create path dependency.

Tier 2 Total

Component	Investment (Rs crore)	Direct jobs	Confidence
Green steel expansion	1,00,000-1,50,000	75,000-100,000	50%
Critical mineral processing	10,000-20,000	15,000-25,000	40%
Stainless steel	15,000-25,000	15,000-20,000	45%
Tier 2 Total	1,25,000-1,95,000	1,05,000-1,45,000

At current exchange rates: $15-23 billion over 10 years — roughly $1.5-2.3 billion per year. This is comparable to Gujarat’s annual industrial investment rate and roughly half of what Tamil Nadu attracts in a good year. It is ambitious for Odisha but not unprecedented for an Indian state.

Tier 3: The Ecosystem (15+ Years, 2030-2045)

What it is: Building the downstream manufacturing ecosystem that captures the highest value from processed materials. Auto components, defense-grade alloys, EV battery components, aerospace materials. This is where the 90/10 split starts to reverse.

3A: Auto Component and Industrial Manufacturing Cluster

Target: Establish an auto component and industrial machinery manufacturing cluster in the Kalinganagar-Paradip corridor, leveraging locally produced steel.

What it would look like: 100-200 tier 2 and tier 3 auto component companies — stamping, forging, machining, welding, heat treatment, surface coating. Supplying the Chennai, Pune, and Sanand auto clusters with components made from Odisha steel.

Investment required: Rs 25,000-40,000 crore (mostly private sector, in increments of Rs 50-500 crore per unit).

Employment: 80,000-120,000 direct + 200,000-300,000 indirect. This is where mass employment at high wages occurs — CNC machinists at Rs 30,000-50,000/month, welding technicians, quality inspectors, die designers.

What it requires:

Reliable, high-quality steel supply (from Tier 2 steel plants)
50+ new ITIs and skill training centres producing CNC operators, welding technologists, quality engineers
SIPCOT/GIDC-style institutional infrastructure — plotted industrial estates with power, water, effluent treatment, single-window clearance. Odisha’s IDCO and IPICOL exist but need the operational excellence of Tamil Nadu’s SIPCOT or Gujarat’s GIDC.
A 10-20 year anchor relationship with at least one major auto OEM, similar to how Hyundai’s 1996 decision to locate at Sriperumbudur eventually pulled 30+ OEMs to Tamil Nadu.

Confidence level: 25%. This is aspirational. No mineral-rich eastern Indian state has ever built an auto component cluster. The skills, institutions, and supplier ecosystem required take 20-30 years to develop. The presence of steel alone is necessary but not sufficient — Tamil Nadu’s auto cluster was built on ports, educated workforce, policy continuity, and institutional design, not on raw material proximity.

However, if Tata Steel’s Kalinganagar expansion reaches 16 MTPA and AI-driven manufacturing lowers the workforce expertise barrier, the economics for a downstream cluster near the steel source become increasingly compelling. It is unlikely to rival Chennai or Pune by 2040. It is possible that it starts to form.

3B: Defense-Grade Alloys and Aerospace Materials

Target: Production of specialty alloys for defense (armor steel, naval-grade steel, missile-grade aluminium), aerospace (titanium alloys, high-temperature nickel alloys), and nuclear applications.

Investment required: Rs 10,000-20,000 crore for specialty alloy plants.

Why Odisha: The raw materials are there — iron ore, chromite (essential for stainless and specialty steels), nickel, manganese, vanadium. India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat defense push creates a specific demand for domestic sources of defense-grade materials.

What it requires: Defense certification (DRDO/DPSu qualification), extremely tight quality control (parts per million tolerances), and a skilled workforce that understands metallurgy at the doctoral level. This is niche manufacturing — not mass production — and it requires the highest level of institutional capability.

Confidence level: 20%. Very low for a 15-year timeframe. Defense and aerospace alloy production requires decades of R&D and institutional credibility. India currently imports most specialty alloys. But if NIT Rourkela and IIT Bhubaneswar develop strong metallurgical research programs linked to defense applications, a beginning is possible.

3C: EV Battery Component Manufacturing

Target: Production of battery-grade manganese sulphate, processed graphite (spheronized for anodes), and potentially nickel sulphate for NMC cathodes — all from Odisha’s mineral deposits.

Investment required: Rs 10,000-15,000 crore for battery material processing.

Employment: 10,000-15,000 direct (highly skilled chemical engineering jobs).

What it requires: Successful Tier 2 critical mineral processing, technology maturation, and most critically, a domestic battery cell manufacturing industry that actually exists at scale (the PLI scheme’s track record is not encouraging).

Confidence level: 30%. Higher than defense alloys because the global demand is clear and growing at 4.5x every 6 years. Lower than other tiers because India’s track record on battery manufacturing is poor, and the technology gap with China is enormous.

Tier 3 Total

Component	Investment (Rs crore)	Direct jobs	Confidence
Auto components	25,000-40,000	80,000-120,000	25%
Defense alloys	10,000-20,000	8,000-12,000	20%
Battery materials	10,000-15,000	10,000-15,000	30%
Tier 3 Total	45,000-75,000	98,000-147,000

The Combined Picture

Tier	Timeframe	Investment (Rs crore)	Direct jobs	Indirect jobs (est.)	Avg. confidence
Tier 1	5 years	25,000-43,000	28,000-45,000	60,000-90,000	~68%
Tier 2	10 years	1,25,000-1,95,000	1,05,000-1,45,000	2,40,000-4,05,000	~45%
Tier 3	15+ years	45,000-75,000	98,000-147,000	2,00,000-4,00,000	~25%
Total		1,95,000-3,13,000	2,31,000-3,37,000	5,00,000-8,95,000

At the high end: Rs 3,13,000 crore ($37 billion) invested over 15 years, creating 3.4 lakh direct jobs and 9 lakh indirect jobs. Odisha’s workforce would shift from a mining-dominated employment base to an industrial manufacturing base, with average wages rising 2-4x.

At the low end (Tier 1 only, which is the most realistic): Rs 25,000 crore ($3 billion) over 5 years, creating 45,000 direct jobs. Meaningful but not transformative.

The real question is whether Odisha can execute Tier 2. Tier 1 is incremental. Tier 3 is aspirational. Tier 2 is where the transformation either happens or doesn’t.

What Could Go Wrong

No honest assessment can omit the failure modes. Here are the most likely:

1. The POSCO Pattern

The biggest risk is that the “announcement economy” continues. Investment summits generate MoU headlines. MoUs generate land acquisition conflicts. Conflicts generate delays. Delays generate corporate withdrawal. Companies leave. The next summit generates new MoUs. The cycle repeats.

This pattern is not hypothetical. It is Odisha’s lived experience for 20 years. Breaking it requires not grand announcements but boring institutional execution — land banks prepared in advance, environmental clearances pre-processed, SIPCOT-style industrial estates built before companies arrive, single-window clearances that actually clear.

2. Chinese Processing Dominance

In the critical minerals space, the risk is that Chinese companies dominate Odisha’s processing capacity the way they dominated Indonesia’s nickel processing. Indonesia’s FDI surge looked impressive on paper — $15 billion in smelter investment. But 60%+ is Chinese-owned and operated. Indonesia traded one form of dependency (exporting raw ore) for another (Chinese-controlled processing on Indonesian soil, with Chinese technology, Chinese workers, and profits repatriated to China).

If Odisha’s critical mineral blocks are won by companies that build processing plants using imported Chinese technology, operated by imported Chinese engineers, producing battery materials for export to Chinese battery factories — the value capture for Odisha’s people will be minimal. The investment numbers will look impressive. The employment and wealth effects will not.

3. Automation Eliminating the Employment Benefit

If AI and automation reduce the workforce needed for manufacturing — as they are already doing in mining — the employment benefit of industrial transformation may be smaller than projected. A green steel plant operated with AI-driven automation might employ 2,000 people instead of 5,000. That is still better than a mine employing 500. But it narrows the gap between “mining state” and “manufacturing state” in employment terms, even if the value capture difference remains large.

4. The Window Closes

Green hydrogen steel needs renewable energy at $40/MWh or below. If Odisha’s renewable energy buildout is slow — if it reaches 5 GW by 2030 instead of 10 GW — the cost of green hydrogen will be too high for competitive steel production. States with faster renewable buildout (Gujarat, Rajasthan) will capture the green steel opportunity. By 2035, the manufacturing ecosystem will have formed elsewhere, and Odisha’s window will have closed — the same way the window closed in 1952 when freight equalization redirected industrial development to western India.

5. Community Resistance Blocks Everything

Every tier requires land. Much of the mineral belt is tribal land. The history of mineral projects on tribal land in Odisha is a history of displacement, broken promises, and resistance. If the state cannot develop a model of industrial development that genuinely includes tribal communities as beneficiaries — not just compensated displaces but stakeholders with equity, employment guarantees, and meaningful consent — then resistance will block expansion just as it blocked POSCO.

The Niyamgiri precedent is not just a legal principle. It is a political reality. Odisha’s tribal communities have learned, through decades of painful experience, that “development” often means their land is taken, their livelihoods destroyed, and the promised benefits never materialize. They will not simply accept the next round of proposals because the minerals have different names. Any Tier 2 or Tier 3 development that does not address this history honestly will face the same resistance that has stalled every major mineral project in the past.

What Would Have to Be True

For Tier 2 to succeed — the transformation tier — the following conditions would all need to hold:

Green hydrogen reaches $2/kg or below in India by 2032-2034. Current trajectory suggests this is possible but not certain.
Odisha builds 15+ GW of renewable energy by 2033. The current target is 10 GW by 2030. Meeting even this target would be a significant achievement for a state that has historically underperformed on renewable deployment.
Land acquisition for industrial use proceeds without repeating the POSCO/Kalinganagar pattern. This requires a fundamentally different approach to tribal consent and benefit-sharing — not just legal compliance but genuine partnership.
The state’s ITI and engineering education system produces 50,000+ skilled industrial workers over the decade. This requires 10-20 new ITIs, expansion of NIT Rourkela, and industry-linked apprenticeship programs at a scale Odisha has never attempted.
Central government policy supports rather than undermines state processing. If Delhi maintains low royalty rates, refuses to index coal royalties, and continues to structure fiscal transfers in ways that disadvantage producing states, the economics of in-state processing become harder. The 2024 Supreme Court ruling on mineral taxation opens a door, but the state must walk through it.
Corporate investment materializes beyond MoUs. Tata Steel’s Kalinganagar expansion is real investment. JSPL’s Angul expansion is real investment. The question is whether 5-10 additional anchor companies make similar commitments over the next decade.
Political continuity. The single most underrated factor. Tamil Nadu built its auto cluster across 50 years of alternating DMK and AIADMK governments that both maintained industrial policy continuity. Gujarat built its chemicals corridor across Congress and BJP governments. If Odisha’s industrial policy changes direction with every election — if a new government abandons its predecessor’s green steel strategy in favor of a different shiny object — Tier 2 will not happen.

If all seven conditions hold, Tier 2 has roughly a 50 percent chance of substantial success. If any two or more fail, the probability drops below 25 percent, and Odisha’s mineral value chain story in 2040 will look depressingly similar to its story in 2025 — rich in the ground, poor in the pocket.

The Real Constraint

The tiers above are economic projections. They are calculable. Capital requirements can be estimated. Employment multipliers can be modeled. Technology trajectories can be projected.

But the real constraint on Odisha’s mineral value chain transformation is not economic. It is institutional. It is the state’s capacity to design, build, and sustain the kind of industrial ecosystem infrastructure that Tamil Nadu built with SIPCOT, Gujarat built with GIDC, and South Korea built with POSCO.

This infrastructure is not physical (though it includes physical assets). It is institutional: the policy frameworks, the regulatory predictability, the single-window clearances that actually function, the land banks that are ready when investment arrives, the ITI system that produces the workers industry needs, the university-industry linkages that drive innovation, and the political consensus that outlasts any single government’s term.

Odisha has demonstrated fiscal discipline (NITI Aayog’s #1 ranking). It has demonstrated disaster management capability (OSDMA’s transformation of cyclone response). It has demonstrated political stability (24 years of BJD, followed by a clear BJP mandate). What it has not yet demonstrated is the institutional capacity for sustained industrial ecosystem building.

The minerals are not going anywhere. They will be in the ground for decades, probably centuries. The technology disruptions — AI, green hydrogen, modular manufacturing — are not going anywhere either. They will continue to lower the barriers to value addition. The question is not whether Odisha’s opportunity exists. It is whether the institutional machinery to capture that opportunity can be built fast enough to catch the window.

The tonne’s journey still starts in Odisha. The question is whether it will also end there.

Sources

IPICOL (Industrial Promotion and Investment Corporation of Odisha). “Invest Odisha — Industrial Infrastructure.” https://invest.odisha.gov.in
GO-SWIFT (Government of Odisha — Single Window for Investor Facilitation and Tracking). “Industrial Clearances.” https://investodisha.gov.in
IDCO (Industrial Development Corporation of Odisha). “Industrial Estates and Parks.” https://www.idco.in
Tata Steel Limited. “Kalinganagar Expansion — Investor Presentation 2024-25.” https://www.tatasteel.com/investors
JSPL (Jindal Steel & Power Limited). “Angul Operations — Capacity Expansion Plans.” https://www.jindalsteelpower.com
Odisha Renewable Energy Policy 2022. Department of Energy, Government of Odisha.
iFOREST. “Renewable Energy Potential in Odisha.” https://iforest.global/event/renewable-energy-potential-in-odisha/
MNRE. “National Green Hydrogen Mission — Targets and Milestones.” Government of India. https://mnre.gov.in/en/national-green-hydrogen-mission/
Ministry of Mines. “National Critical Mineral Mission — Implementation Framework.” Government of India. https://mines.gov.in
NITI Aayog. “Fiscal Health Index 2025.” Government of India. https://niti.gov.in
SIPCOT (State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu). “Industrial Complexes — Model.” https://sipcot.tn.gov.in
GIDC (Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation). “Infrastructure Development Model.” https://www.gidc.gov.in
Make in Odisha Conclave 2024. “Investment Commitments Summary.” Government of Odisha.
Supreme Court of India. “Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India.” July 25, 2024.
Argus Media. “Indian Steel Exports and CBAM Risk Assessment.” 2025. https://www.argusmedia.com
IEA. “Global Hydrogen Review 2025.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2025
IEEFA. “India Battery PLI Scheme Assessment.” 2025. https://ieefa.org
ACMA (Automotive Component Manufacturers Association of India). “Indian Auto Component Industry Overview 2024.” https://www.acma.in
CII (Confederation of Indian Industry). “State Competitiveness Index.” https://www.cii.in
DMF (District Mineral Foundation) Reports. Keonjhar, Sundargarh, Angul, Jajpur districts. Government of Odisha.

Source Research

The raw research that informs this series.